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远程系统发现

ID Name
T1018.001 协议合规化网络拓扑测绘
T1018.002 基于云服务元数据API的隐蔽发现
T1018.003 分布式低频存活探测
T1018.004 合法管理协议劫持

远程系统发现是攻击者通过各类网络协议和系统工具识别目标环境中可用设备及其拓扑关系的技术手段，通常为后续横向移动和权限提升提供关键情报。传统检测方法主要监控异常进程行为（如短时间内连续执行ping、net view命令）、分析协议交互特征（如非常规端口扫描模式）以及识别非常规工具使用（如渗透测试框架中的网络发现模块）。防御措施包括强化网络设备日志审计、实施严格的权限隔离策略以及部署网络流量异常检测系统。

为规避传统检测机制对集中式、高频次探测行为的识别能力，攻击者发展出多种新型隐蔽发现技术，通过协议深度伪装、云服务机制滥用、分布式任务调度及合法管理通道劫持等策略，将节点发现过程解构为低强度、多源化的合法网络交互，实现攻击行为的"去特征化"和"业务场景融合"。

现有远程系统发现匿迹技术的核心演进路径体现在三个维度：首先是攻击面的技术栈下沉，从传统网络层探测转向云原生API调用和管理协议交互，利用基础设施的信任机制绕过边界防护；其次是行为特征的时空重构，通过分布式架构将单点高频探测转化为多点低频交互，破坏基于时间序列分析和源IP聚类的检测模型；最后是攻击上下文的深度适配，将恶意载荷嵌入目标环境的业务工作流，如利用运维系统的周期性任务调度或云平台的自动化扩展机制。四类子技术的共性在于突破传统攻击流量与合法流量的可区分边界，通过协议合规性证明、业务逻辑寄生和资源权限滥用，赋予恶意发现行为与正常网络操作相同的特征属性。

匿迹技术的发展使得传统基于规则匹配和单维阈值告警的防御体系面临严峻挑战，防御方需构建云网端协同的深度行为审计能力，实施细粒度的API调用权限管控，并引入基于上下文感知的动态基线分析技术，实现对隐蔽发现行为的精准识别与阻断。

ID: T1018
Sub-techniques:  T1018.001, T1018.002, T1018.003, T1018.004
ⓘ
Tactic: 环境测绘
ⓘ
Platforms: Linux, Network, Windows, macOS
Contributors: Austin Clark, @c2defense; Daniel Stepanic, Elastic; RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs
Version: 3.5
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 14 August 2023

匿迹效应

效应类型 是否存在
特征伪装 ✅
行为透明 ❌
数据遮蔽 ✅
时空释痕 ✅

特征伪装

攻击者通过精确模拟合法管理协议（如SNMP、CDP）的交互模式，使恶意探测流量在协议字段结构、会话时序等方面与正常运维流量完全一致。在云环境场景中，通过严格遵循云服务商API规范构造请求参数，使得元数据查询行为与自动化运维工具的操作特征难以区分，实现攻击流量的"协议级隐身"。

数据遮蔽

在基于云服务元数据API的探测过程中，攻击者利用HTTPS加密通道隐藏查询内容和响应数据，使网络层监控设备无法通过深度包检测识别恶意意图。同时，探测结果通过多跳加密链路回传，中间节点实施数据分片混淆，阻断防御方对信息外传链路的追踪分析。

时空释痕

分布式低频探测技术通过将传统集中式扫描任务拆解为跨地域、长周期的离散请求，使单次探测行为的时间间隔和空间分布均符合目标网络的正常业务特征。结合自适应节奏控制算法动态调整探测频率，避免形成可识别的周期性模式，将攻击特征稀释在复杂的网络背景流量中。

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
C0028 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets. [1]
C0025 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team checked for connectivity to resources within the network and used LDAP to query Active Directory, discovering information about computers listed in AD.[2]
S0552 AdFind

AdFind has the ability to query Active Directory for computers.[3][4][5][6]
G1030 Agrius

Agrius used the tool NBTscan to scan for remote, accessible hosts in victim environments.[7]
G1024 Akira

Akira uses software such as Advanced IP Scanner and MASSCAN to identify remote hosts within victim networks.[8]
G0022 APT3

APT3 has a tool that can detect the existence of remote systems.[9][10]
G0050 APT32

APT32 has enumerated DC servers using the command net group "Domain Controllers" /domain. The group has also used the ping command.[11]
G0087 APT39

APT39 has used NBTscan and custom tools to discover remote systems.[12][13][14]
G0096 APT41

APT41 has used MiPing to discover active systems in the victim network.[15]

S0099 Arp

Arp can be used to display a host's ARP cache, which may include address resolutions for remote systems.[16][17]
S0093 Backdoor.Oldrea

Backdoor.Oldrea can enumerate and map ICS-specific systems in victim environments.[18]
S1081 BADHATCH

BADHATCH can use a PowerShell object such as, System.Net.NetworkInformation.Ping to ping a computer.[19]
S0534 Bazar

Bazar can enumerate remote systems using Net View.[20]
S0570 BitPaymer

BitPaymer can use net view to discover remote systems.[21]
S1070 Black Basta

Black Basta can use LDAP queries to connect to AD and iterate over connected workstations.[22]
S1068 BlackCat

BlackCat can broadcasts NetBIOS Name Service (NBNC) messages to search for servers connected to compromised networks.[23]
S0521 BloodHound

BloodHound can enumerate and collect the properties of domain computers, including domain controllers.[24]
G0060 BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER typically use ping and Net to enumerate systems.[25]
C0015 C0015

During C0015, the threat actors used the commands net view /all /domain and ping to discover remote systems. They also used PowerView's PowerShell Invoke-ShareFinder script for file share enumeration.[26]
S0335 Carbon

Carbon uses the net view command.[27]
G0114 Chimera

Chimera has utilized various scans and queries to find domain controllers and remote services in the target environment.[28]
S0154 Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike uses the native Windows Network Enumeration APIs to interrogate and discover targets in a Windows Active Directory network.[29][30][31]
S0244 Comnie

Comnie runs the net view command
S0575 Conti

Conti has the ability to discover hosts on a target network.[32]
S0488 CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec can discover active IP addresses, along with the machine name, within a targeted network.[33]
G0009 Deep Panda

Deep Panda has used ping to identify other machines of interest.[34]
S0659 Diavol

Diavol can use the ARP table to find remote hosts to scan.[35]

G0035 Dragonfly

Dragonfly has likely obtained a list of hosts in the victim environment.[36]
S0694 DRATzarus

DRATzarus can search for other machines connected to compromised host and attempt to map the network.[37]
S1159 DUSTTRAP

DUSTTRAP can use ping to identify remote hosts within the victim network.[38]
G1006 Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca used the command powershell "Get-EventLog -LogName security -Newest 500 | where {$_.EventID -eq 4624} | format-list -property * | findstr "Address"" to find the network information of successfully logged-in accounts to discovery addresses of other machines. Earth Lusca has also used multiple scanning tools to discover other machines within the same compromised network.[39]
G1003 Ember Bear

Ember Bear has used tools such as Nmap and MASSCAN for remote service discovery.[40]
S0091 Epic

Epic uses the net view command on the victim’s machine.[41]
G0053 FIN5

FIN5 has used the open source tool Essential NetTools to map the network and build a list of targets.[42]
G0037 FIN6

FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft's built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.[43]
G0061 FIN8

FIN8 has used dsquery and other Active Directory utilities to enumerate hosts; they have also used nltest.exe /dclist to retrieve a list of domain controllers.[44][45]
S0696 Flagpro

Flagpro has been used to execute net view on a targeted system.[46]

G0117 Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used Angry IP Scanner to detect remote systems.[47]
S1044 FunnyDream

FunnyDream can collect information about hosts on the victim network.[48]
C0007 FunnyDream

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used several tools and batch files to map victims' internal networks.[49]
G0093 GALLIUM

GALLIUM used a modified version of NBTscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers over the network as well as ping to identify remote systems.[50]
G0125 HAFNIUM

HAFNIUM has enumerated domain controllers using net group "Domain computers" and nltest /dclist.[51]
S0698 HermeticWizard

HermeticWizard can find machines on the local network by gathering known local IP addresses through DNSGetCacheDataTable, GetIpNetTable,WNetOpenEnumW(RESOURCE_GLOBALNET, RESOURCETYPE_ANY),NetServerEnum,GetTcpTable, and GetAdaptersAddresses.[52]
G1001 HEXANE

HEXANE has used net view to enumerate domain machines.[53]
G0119 Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider has used PowerView to enumerate all Windows Server, Windows Server 2003, and Windows 7 instances in the Active Directory database.[54]
S0604 Industroyer

Industroyer can enumerate remote computers in the compromised network.[55]
G0004 Ke3chang

Ke3chang has used network scanning and enumeration tools, including Ping.[56]
S0599 Kinsing

Kinsing has used a script to parse files like /etc/hosts and SSH known_hosts to discover remote systems.[57]
S0236 Kwampirs

Kwampirs collects a list of available servers with the command net view.[58]
G0077 Leafminer

Leafminer used Microsoft’s Sysinternals tools to gather detailed information about remote systems.[59]
G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound has used Ping for discovery on targeted networks.[60]
G0045 menuPass

menuPass uses scripts to enumerate IP ranges on the victim network. menuPass has also issued the command net view /domain to a PlugX implant to gather information about remote systems on the network.[61][62]
S1146 MgBot

MgBot includes modules for performing ARP scans of local connected systems.[63]
S0233 MURKYTOP

MURKYTOP has the capability to identify remote hosts on connected networks.[64]
G0019 Naikon

Naikon has used a netbios scanner for remote machine identification.[65]
S0590 NBTscan

NBTscan can list NetBIOS computer names.[66][67]

S0039 Net

Commands such as net view can be used in Net to gather information about available remote systems.[68]
S0385 njRAT

njRAT can identify remote hosts on connected networks.[69]
S0359 Nltest

Nltest may be used to enumerate remote domain controllers using options such as /dclist and /dsgetdc.[70]
S0365 Olympic Destroyer

Olympic Destroyer uses Windows Management Instrumentation to enumerate all systems in the network.[71]
C0012 Operation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net view and ping commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.[72]
C0014 Operation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used nbtscan and ping to discover remote systems, as well as dsquery subnet on a domain controller to retrieve all subnets in the Active Directory.[73]
S0165 OSInfo

OSInfo performs a connection test to discover remote systems in the network[9]
S0097 Ping

Ping can be used to identify remote systems within a network.[74]
G1040 Play

Play has used tools such as AdFind, Nltest, and BloodHound to enumerate shares and hostnames on compromised networks.[75]
S0428 PoetRAT

PoetRAT used Nmap for remote system discovery.[76]
S0650 QakBot

QakBot can identify remote systems through the net view command.[77][78][79]
S0241 RATANKBA

RATANKBA runs the net view /domain and net view commands.[80]
S0125 Remsec

Remsec can ping or traceroute a remote host.[81]
S0684 ROADTools

ROADTools can enumerate Azure AD systems and devices.[82]
G0106 Rocke

Rocke has looked for IP addresses in the known_hosts file on the infected system and attempted to SSH into them.[83]

G0034 Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP, discovering information about computers listed in AD.[84][2]

G1015 Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider can enumerate remote systems, such as VMware vCenter infrastructure.[85]
S0140 Shamoon

Shamoon scans the C-class subnet of the IPs on the victim's interfaces.[86]
S0063 SHOTPUT

SHOTPUT has a command to list all servers in the domain, as well as one to locate domain controllers on a domain.[87]
G0091 Silence

Silence has used Nmap to scan the corporate network, build a network topology, and identify vulnerable hosts.[88]

S0692 SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can enumerate and collect the properties of domain computers.[89]
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used AdFind to enumerate remote systems.[90]
S0646 SpicyOmelette

SpicyOmelette can identify payment systems, payment gateways, and ATM systems in compromised environments.[91]
S0018 Sykipot

Sykipot may use net view /domain to display hostnames of available systems on a network.[92]
S0586 TAINTEDSCRIBE

The TAINTEDSCRIBE command and execution module can perform target system enumeration.[93]
G0027 Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has used the net view command.[94]
G1022 ToddyCat

ToddyCat has used ping %REMOTE_HOST% for post exploit discovery.[95]
S0266 TrickBot

TrickBot can enumerate computers and network devices.[96]
G0010 Turla

Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover remote systems on a local network using the net view and net view /DOMAIN commands. Turla has also used net group "Domain Computers" /domain, net group "Domain Controllers" /domain, and net group "Exchange Servers" /domain to enumerate domain computers, including the organization's DC and Exchange Server.[41][97]
S0452 USBferry

USBferry can use net view to gather information about remote systems.[98]
G1017 Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has used multiple methods, including Ping, to enumerate systems on compromised networks.[99][100]
S0366 WannaCry

WannaCry scans its local network segment for remote systems to try to exploit and copy itself to.[101]
G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used networkdll for network discovery and psfin specifically for financial and point of sale indicators. Wizard Spider has also used AdFind, nltest/dclist, and PowerShell script Get-DataInfo.ps1 to enumerate domain computers, including the domain controller.[5][102][103][3][104][105]
S0248 yty

yty uses the net view command for discovery.[106]

Mitigations

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. For network devices, monitor executed commands in AAA logs, especially those run by unexpected or unauthorized users.

Windows PowerShell log Event ID 4104 (PS script execution) can be used to capture PowerShell script block contents which may contain commands used as a precursor to RDP Hijacking. For example, the following command in a PowerShell script block may be used to enumerate the systems on a network which have RDP access: Find-DomainLocalGroupMember -GroupName "Remote Desktop Users" | select -expand ComputerName.

DS0022 File File Access

Monitor for files (such as /etc/hosts) being accessed that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system.

For Windows, Event ID 4663 (An Attempt Was Made to Access An Object) can be used to alert on access attempts of local files that store host data, including C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts.

For Linux, auditing frameworks such as the audit daemon (auditd) can be used to alert on access attempts of local files that store host data, including /etc/hosts.
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Connection Creation

Monitor for newly constructed network connections associated with pings/scans that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system.
DS0009 Process Process Creation

Monitor for newly executed processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.[107]

References

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