系统恢复抑制是指攻击者通过禁用或破坏操作系统及应用程序的恢复机制,阻止受害系统从故障或攻击中复原的破坏性技术。该技术常被用于勒索软件攻击链的最后阶段,通过删除卷影副本、清除备份目录、禁用自动修复功能等手段,确保数据加密破坏的不可逆性。传统防御手段主要依赖进程监控(如vssadmin、wbadmin调用检测)、事件日志分析(如Windows事件ID 524)和备份完整性校验等方法来识别异常恢复抑制行为。
为规避传统检测机制,攻击者逐步发展出融合合法工具滥用、密码学破坏和云环境渗透的新型隐蔽抑制技术。这些技术不再依赖显式的破坏性指令,而是通过系统功能深度操纵和信任链污染实现持久化破坏,显著提高了攻击行为的隐蔽性和破坏后果的不可修复性。
当前系统恢复抑制匿迹技术的核心演进方向体现为三个维度:首先是操作形态的合法化,通过系统管理工具的参数化滥用和进程注入,将恶意操作伪装成日常维护行为;其次是破坏机制的密码学增强,采用与目标系统兼容的加密算法实施元数据破坏,规避基于文件完整性监控的检测;最后是攻击平面的云化扩展,利用云服务API和同步机制的自动化特性实施跨平台污染。三类技术的共性在于突破传统文件删除/服务停止的显式操作模式,转而通过系统功能重组、数据流劫持和信任关系滥用实现恢复能力的渐进式瓦解,使得防御方难以通过单一维度的监控策略及时感知攻击。
匿迹技术的演进迫使防御体系从进程监控转向行为链分析,需建立备份操作基线模型、云API调用关系图谱等新型检测能力,并引入密码学证明机制验证备份元数据真实性,方能有效应对隐蔽式系统恢复抑制攻击。
| 效应类型 | 是否存在 |
|---|---|
| 特征伪装 | ✅ |
| 行为透明 | ❌ |
| 数据遮蔽 | ✅ |
| 时空释痕 | ❌ |
攻击者通过滥用系统管理工具和云服务API,将恢复抑制操作伪装成合法维护行为。例如使用vssadmin.exe的标准参数执行卷影副本删除,或通过AWS CLI工具调用合规API执行备份版本清除。此类操作在进程树、命令行日志等维度均呈现合法特征,使得基于白名单机制的防御系统难以识别异常。
在备份元数据加密破坏子技术中,攻击者使用标准加密协议对关键元数据进行转换,加密后的数据仍保持格式合规性和数字签名有效性。这种加密遮蔽使得基于内容扫描或哈希比对的检测机制失效,防御方必须实施密钥管理审计或解密验证才能发现数据异常。
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S1129 | Akira |
Akira will delete system volume shadow copies via PowerShell commands.[1] |
| S0640 | Avaddon |
Avaddon deletes backups and shadow copies using native system tools.[2][3] |
| S0638 | Babuk |
Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using |
| S1136 | BFG Agonizer |
BFG Agonizer wipes the boot sector of infected machines to inhibit system recovery.[6] |
| S0570 | BitPaymer |
BitPaymer attempts to remove the backup shadow files from the host using |
| S1070 | Black Basta |
Black Basta can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe.[8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][15][16] |
| S1068 | BlackCat |
BlackCat can delete shadow copies using |
| S0611 | Clop |
Clop can delete the shadow volumes with |
| S0608 | Conficker |
Conficker resets system restore points and deletes backup files.[19] |
| S0575 | Conti |
Conti can delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies using |
| S1111 | DarkGate |
DarkGate can delete system restore points through the command |
| S0673 | DarkWatchman |
DarkWatchman can delete shadow volumes using |
| S0616 | DEATHRANSOM |
DEATHRANSOM can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.[23] |
| S0659 | Diavol |
Diavol can delete shadow copies using the |
| S0605 | EKANS |
EKANS removes backups of Volume Shadow Copies to disable any restoration capabilities.[25][26] |
| S0618 | FIVEHANDS |
FIVEHANDS has the ability to delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.[23][27] |
| S0132 | H1N1 |
H1N1 disable recovery options and deletes shadow copies from the victim.[28] |
| S0617 | HELLOKITTY |
HELLOKITTY can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.[23] |
| S0697 | HermeticWiper |
HermeticWiper can disable the VSS service on a compromised host using the service control manager.[29][30][31] |
| S1139 | INC Ransomware |
INC Ransomware can delete volume shadow copy backups from victim machines.[32] |
| S0260 | InvisiMole |
InvisiMole can can remove all system restore points.[33] |
| S0389 | JCry |
JCry has been observed deleting shadow copies to ensure that data cannot be restored easily.[34] |
| S0449 | Maze |
Maze has attempted to delete the shadow volumes of infected machines, once before and once after the encryption process.[35][36] |
| S0576 | MegaCortex |
MegaCortex has deleted volume shadow copies using |
| S0688 | Meteor |
Meteor can use |
| S1135 | MultiLayer Wiper |
MultiLayer Wiper wipes the boot sector of infected systems to inhibit system recovery.[6] |
| S0457 | Netwalker |
Netwalker can delete the infected system's Shadow Volumes to prevent recovery.[39][40] |
| S0365 | Olympic Destroyer |
Olympic Destroyer uses the native Windows utilities |
| S1162 | Playcrypt | |
| S1058 | Prestige |
Prestige can delete the backup catalog from the target system using: |
| S0654 | ProLock |
ProLock can use vssadmin.exe to remove volume shadow copies.[44] |
| S0583 | Pysa | |
| S0481 | Ragnar Locker |
Ragnar Locker can delete volume shadow copies using |
| S0496 | REvil |
REvil can use vssadmin to delete volume shadow copies and bcdedit to disable recovery features.[47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55] |
| S1150 | ROADSWEEP |
ROADSWEEP has the ability to disable |
| S0400 | RobbinHood |
RobbinHood deletes shadow copies to ensure that all the data cannot be restored easily.[58] |
| S1073 | Royal |
Royal can delete shadow copy backups with vssadmin.exe using the command |
| S0446 | Ryuk |
Ryuk has used |
| G0034 | Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team uses Prestige to delete the backup catalog from the target system using: |
| S0366 | WannaCry |
WannaCry uses |
| S0612 | WastedLocker |
WastedLocker can delete shadow volumes.[66][67][68] |
| G0102 | Wizard Spider |
Wizard Spider has used WMIC and vssadmin to manually delete volume shadow copies. Wizard Spider has also used Conti ransomware to delete volume shadow copies automatically with the use of vssadmin.[69] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1053 | Data Backup |
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[70] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery. In cloud environments, enable versioning on storage objects where possible, and copy backups to other accounts or regions to isolate them from the original copies.[71] |
| M1038 | Execution Prevention |
Consider using application control configured to block execution of utilities such as |
| M1028 | Operating System Configuration |
Consider technical controls to prevent the disabling of services or deletion of files involved in system recovery. Additionally, ensure that WinRE is enabled using the following command: |
| M1018 | User Account Management |
Limit the user accounts that have access to backups to only those required. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control Policies to restrict API calls to delete backups, snapshots, and images. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0010 | Cloud Storage | Cloud Storage Deletion |
Monitor for unexpected deletion of a cloud storage objects (ex: AWS |
| DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as |
| DS0022 | File | File Deletion |
The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity. |
| DS0009 | Process | Process Creation |
Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as Analytic 1 - Detecting Shadow Copy Deletion or Resize
Analytic 2 - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification
|
| DS0019 | Service | Service Metadata |
Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Note: For Windows, Event ID 7040 can be used to alert on changes to the start type of a service (e.g., going from enabled at startup to disabled) associated with system recovery. |
| DS0020 | Snapshot | Snapshot Deletion |
Monitor for unexpected deletion of snapshots (ex: AWS |
| DS0024 | Windows Registry | Windows Registry Key Modification |
Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of |