系统恢复抑制

系统恢复抑制是指攻击者通过禁用或破坏操作系统及应用程序的恢复机制,阻止受害系统从故障或攻击中复原的破坏性技术。该技术常被用于勒索软件攻击链的最后阶段,通过删除卷影副本、清除备份目录、禁用自动修复功能等手段,确保数据加密破坏的不可逆性。传统防御手段主要依赖进程监控(如vssadmin、wbadmin调用检测)、事件日志分析(如Windows事件ID 524)和备份完整性校验等方法来识别异常恢复抑制行为。

为规避传统检测机制,攻击者逐步发展出融合合法工具滥用、密码学破坏和云环境渗透的新型隐蔽抑制技术。这些技术不再依赖显式的破坏性指令,而是通过系统功能深度操纵和信任链污染实现持久化破坏,显著提高了攻击行为的隐蔽性和破坏后果的不可修复性。

当前系统恢复抑制匿迹技术的核心演进方向体现为三个维度:首先是操作形态的合法化,通过系统管理工具的参数化滥用和进程注入,将恶意操作伪装成日常维护行为;其次是破坏机制的密码学增强,采用与目标系统兼容的加密算法实施元数据破坏,规避基于文件完整性监控的检测;最后是攻击平面的云化扩展,利用云服务API和同步机制的自动化特性实施跨平台污染。三类技术的共性在于突破传统文件删除/服务停止的显式操作模式,转而通过系统功能重组、数据流劫持和信任关系滥用实现恢复能力的渐进式瓦解,使得防御方难以通过单一维度的监控策略及时感知攻击。

匿迹技术的演进迫使防御体系从进程监控转向行为链分析,需建立备份操作基线模型、云API调用关系图谱等新型检测能力,并引入密码学证明机制验证备份元数据真实性,方能有效应对隐蔽式系统恢复抑制攻击。

ID: T1490
Sub-techniques:  T1490.001, T1490.002, T1490.003
Tactic: 影响释放
Platforms: Containers, IaaS, Linux, Network, Windows, macOS
Impact Type: Availability
Contributors: Austin Clark, @c2defense; Harjot Shah Singh; Joey Lei; Pallavi Sivakumaran, WithSecure; Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct
Version: 1.5
Created: 02 April 2019
Last Modified: 24 September 2024

匿迹效应

效应类型 是否存在
特征伪装
行为透明
数据遮蔽
时空释痕

特征伪装

攻击者通过滥用系统管理工具和云服务API,将恢复抑制操作伪装成合法维护行为。例如使用vssadmin.exe的标准参数执行卷影副本删除,或通过AWS CLI工具调用合规API执行备份版本清除。此类操作在进程树、命令行日志等维度均呈现合法特征,使得基于白名单机制的防御系统难以识别异常。

数据遮蔽

在备份元数据加密破坏子技术中,攻击者使用标准加密协议对关键元数据进行转换,加密后的数据仍保持格式合规性和数字签名有效性。这种加密遮蔽使得基于内容扫描或哈希比对的检测机制失效,防御方必须实施密钥管理审计或解密验证才能发现数据异常。

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1129 Akira

Akira will delete system volume shadow copies via PowerShell commands.[1]

S0640 Avaddon

Avaddon deletes backups and shadow copies using native system tools.[2][3]

S0638 Babuk

Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet.[4][5]

S1136 BFG Agonizer

BFG Agonizer wipes the boot sector of infected machines to inhibit system recovery.[6]

S0570 BitPaymer

BitPaymer attempts to remove the backup shadow files from the host using vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet.[7]

S1070 Black Basta

Black Basta can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe.[8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][15][16]

S1068 BlackCat

BlackCat can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet and wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete; it can also modify the boot loader using bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No.[17]

S0611 Clop

Clop can delete the shadow volumes with vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet and can use bcdedit to disable recovery options.[18]

S0608 Conficker

Conficker resets system restore points and deletes backup files.[19]

S0575 Conti

Conti can delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.[20]

S1111 DarkGate

DarkGate can delete system restore points through the command cmd.exe /c vssadmin delete shadows /for=c: /all /quiet".[21]

S0673 DarkWatchman

DarkWatchman can delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe.[22]

S0616 DEATHRANSOM

DEATHRANSOM can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.[23]

S0659 Diavol

Diavol can delete shadow copies using the IVssBackupComponents COM object to call the DeleteSnapshots method.[24]

S0605 EKANS

EKANS removes backups of Volume Shadow Copies to disable any restoration capabilities.[25][26]

S0618 FIVEHANDS

FIVEHANDS has the ability to delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.[23][27]

S0132 H1N1

H1N1 disable recovery options and deletes shadow copies from the victim.[28]

S0617 HELLOKITTY

HELLOKITTY can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.[23]

S0697 HermeticWiper

HermeticWiper can disable the VSS service on a compromised host using the service control manager.[29][30][31]

S1139 INC Ransomware

INC Ransomware can delete volume shadow copy backups from victim machines.[32]

S0260 InvisiMole

InvisiMole can can remove all system restore points.[33]

S0389 JCry

JCry has been observed deleting shadow copies to ensure that data cannot be restored easily.[34]

S0449 Maze

Maze has attempted to delete the shadow volumes of infected machines, once before and once after the encryption process.[35][36]

S0576 MegaCortex

MegaCortex has deleted volume shadow copies using vssadmin.exe.[37]

S0688 Meteor

Meteor can use bcdedit to delete different boot identifiers on a compromised host; it can also use vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet and C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete.[38]

S1135 MultiLayer Wiper

MultiLayer Wiper wipes the boot sector of infected systems to inhibit system recovery.[6]

S0457 Netwalker

Netwalker can delete the infected system's Shadow Volumes to prevent recovery.[39][40]

S0365 Olympic Destroyer

Olympic Destroyer uses the native Windows utilities vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit to delete and disable operating system recovery features such as the Windows backup catalog and Windows Automatic Repair.[41]

S1162 Playcrypt

Playcrypt can use AlphaVSS to delete shadow copies.[42]

S1058 Prestige

Prestige can delete the backup catalog from the target system using: c:\Windows\System32\wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet and can also delete volume shadow copies using: \Windows\System32\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet.[43]

S0654 ProLock

ProLock can use vssadmin.exe to remove volume shadow copies.[44]

S0583 Pysa

Pysa has the functionality to delete shadow copies.[45]

S0481 Ragnar Locker

Ragnar Locker can delete volume shadow copies using vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet.[46]

S0496 REvil

REvil can use vssadmin to delete volume shadow copies and bcdedit to disable recovery features.[47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55]

S1150 ROADSWEEP

ROADSWEEP has the ability to disable SystemRestore and Volume Shadow Copies.[56][57]

S0400 RobbinHood

RobbinHood deletes shadow copies to ensure that all the data cannot be restored easily.[58]

S1073 Royal

Royal can delete shadow copy backups with vssadmin.exe using the command delete shadows /all /quiet.[59][60][61]

S0446 Ryuk

Ryuk has used vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet to to delete volume shadow copies and vssadmin resize shadowstorage to force deletion of shadow copies created by third-party applications.[62]

G0034 Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team uses Prestige to delete the backup catalog from the target system using: C:\Windows\System32\wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet and to delete volume shadow copies using: C:\Windows\System32\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet. [43]

S0366 WannaCry

WannaCry uses vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, and wmic to delete and disable operating system recovery features.[63][64][65]

S0612 WastedLocker

WastedLocker can delete shadow volumes.[66][67][68]

G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used WMIC and vssadmin to manually delete volume shadow copies. Wizard Spider has also used Conti ransomware to delete volume shadow copies automatically with the use of vssadmin.[69]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1053 Data Backup

Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[70] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery. In cloud environments, enable versioning on storage objects where possible, and copy backups to other accounts or regions to isolate them from the original copies.[71]

M1038 Execution Prevention

Consider using application control configured to block execution of utilities such as diskshadow.exe that may not be required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.

M1028 Operating System Configuration

Consider technical controls to prevent the disabling of services or deletion of files involved in system recovery. Additionally, ensure that WinRE is enabled using the following command: reagentc /enable.[72]

M1018 User Account Management

Limit the user accounts that have access to backups to only those required. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control Policies to restrict API calls to delete backups, snapshots, and images.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0010 Cloud Storage Cloud Storage Deletion

Monitor for unexpected deletion of a cloud storage objects (ex: AWS DeleteObject), especially those associated with cloud backups.

DS0017 Command Command Execution

Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit.

DS0022 File File Deletion

The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity.

DS0009 Process Process Creation

Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. After compromising a network of systems, threat actors often try to delete/resize Shadow Copy in an attempt to prevent administrators from restoring the systems to versions present before the attack. This is often done via vssadmin, a legitimate Windows tool to interact with shadow copies. This action is often employed by ransomware, may lead to a failure in recovering systems after an attack. The pseudo code detection focus on Windows Security and Sysmon process creation (4688 and 1). The use of wmic to delete shadow copy generates WMI-Activity Operationnal 5857 event and could generate 5858 (if the operation fails). These 2 EventIDs could be interesting when attackers use wmic without process creation and/or for forensics.

Analytic 1 - Detecting Shadow Copy Deletion or Resize

(source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688")(CommandLine="vssadmin delete shadows" OR CommandLine="wmic shadowcopy delete" OR CommandLine="vssadmin resize shadowstorage")) OR (EventCode="5857" ProviderName="MSVSS__PROVIDER") OR (EventCode="5858" Operation="Win32_ShadowCopy")

Analytic 2 - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification

(source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") Image= "C:\Windows\System32\bcdedit.exe" AND CommandLine="recoveryenabled"

DS0019 Service Service Metadata

Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery.

Note: For Windows, Event ID 7040 can be used to alert on changes to the start type of a service (e.g., going from enabled at startup to disabled) associated with system recovery.

DS0020 Snapshot Snapshot Deletion

Monitor for unexpected deletion of snapshots (ex: AWS DeleteSnapshot, DeleteDBSnapshot), especially those associated with cloud backups.

DS0024 Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Modification

Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage).

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