软件发现

软件发现是攻击者通过枚举系统或云环境中安装的软件及其版本来收集情报的技术,通常用于识别潜在攻击面(如存在漏洞的软件版本)或安全防护措施(如杀毒软件)。传统检测方法通过监控进程创建事件、命令行参数特征以及异常API调用序列来识别恶意枚举行为,防御措施侧重限制敏感工具的访问权限和实施最小特权原则。

为规避传统检测机制,攻击者发展出新型匿迹技术,通过合法管理工具劫持、软件信息碎片化嗅探等手段,将软件发现行为深度融入正常系统活动,在降低行为异常性的同时提升数据收集的隐蔽性。

当前软件发现匿迹技术的演进呈现两大特征:首先是对系统信任机制的滥用,通过合法工具调用和API函数合规化使用实现"白利用"攻击;其次是操作痕迹的时空分散化,采用非持久化执行、分布式任务分发等策略规避单点检测。具体而言,合法工具链隐蔽枚举技术利用系统管理行为的"灰色地带",通过参数级伪装规避基于命令行特征的检测;碎片化嗅探则通过旁路数据源的渐进式收集,避免触发针对直接探测的防御规则。这些技术的共同本质在于重构软件发现行为的特征表达形式,使其在行为模式、数据载体、交互协议等维度与合法活动形成高度相似性。

匿迹技术的发展迫使防御体系从单一事件检测转向行为链分析,需构建跨主机-网络-日志的协同检测框架,并引入软件资产指纹动态校验机制。同时应强化对系统管理工具的细粒度监控,建立基于上下文行为的异常操作识别模型。

ID: T1518
Sub-techniques:  T1518.001, T1518.002
Tactic: 环境测绘
Platforms: IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS
Version: 1.4
Created: 16 September 2019
Last Modified: 16 April 2024

匿迹效应

效应类型 是否存在
特征伪装
行为透明
数据遮蔽
时空释痕

特征伪装

攻击者通过模拟合法管理工具的操作模式和输出格式,使软件发现行为在进程特征、命令行参数、日志记录等方面与正常运维活动高度一致。例如使用PowerShell脚本按标准格式输出软件列表,或构造符合Ansible剧本规范的扫描任务,有效规避基于行为特征匹配的检测规则。

数据遮蔽

命令语义混淆将软件发现活动与正常的系统管理操作混淆,使攻击行为看起来像是系统管理员的常规检查。采用HTTPS加密通道传输扫描结果或通过内存加密存储中间数据,避免敏感信息在磁盘或网络传输过程中暴露,有效隐藏了攻击者的侦查意图。

时空释痕

分布式架构将集中式扫描任务分解为跨地域、长周期的离散操作,单个节点的低频次探测行为难以触发阈值告警。结合日志注入技术制造的噪音背景,使得攻击特征在时间和空间维度被充分稀释,传统基于单点实时分析的检测机制难以有效识别。

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0534 Bazar

Bazar can query the Registry for installed applications.[1]

G0060 BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host.[2]

S0482 Bundlore

Bundlore has the ability to enumerate what browser is being used as well as version information for Safari.[3]

S0674 CharmPower

CharmPower can list the installed applications on a compromised host.[4]

S0154 Cobalt Strike

The Cobalt Strike System Profiler can discover applications through the browser and identify the version of Java the target has.[5]

S0126 ComRAT

ComRAT can check the victim's default browser to determine which process to inject its communications module into.[6]

S1153 Cuckoo Stealer

Cuckoo Stealer has the ability to search systems for installed applications.[7]

S0472 down_new

down_new has the ability to gather information on installed applications.[2]

S0384 Dridex

Dridex has collected a list of installed software on the system.[8]

S0062 DustySky

DustySky lists all installed software for the infected machine.[9]

S0024 Dyre

Dyre has the ability to identify installed programs on a compromised host.[10]

G1001 HEXANE

HEXANE has enumerated programs installed on an infected machine.[11]

S0431 HotCroissant

HotCroissant can retrieve a list of applications from the SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths registry key.[12]

G0100 Inception

Inception has enumerated installed software on compromised systems.[13]

S0260 InvisiMole

InvisiMole can collect information about installed software used by specific users, software executed on user login, and software executed by each system.[14][15]

S0526 KGH_SPY

KGH_SPY can collect information on installed applications.[16]

S1141 LunarWeb

LunarWeb can list installed software on compromised systems.[17]

S0652 MarkiRAT

MarkiRAT can check for the Telegram installation directory by enumerating the files on disk.[18]

S0455 Metamorfo

Metamorfo has searched the compromised system for banking applications.[19][20]

G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connectivity on the target machine.[21]

G0129 Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has searched the victim system for the InstallUtil.exe program and its version.[22]

C0016 Operation Dust Storm

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors deployed a file called DeployJava.js to fingerprint installed software on a victim system prior to exploit delivery.[23]

C0014 Operation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors collected a list of installed software on the infected system.[24]

S0229 Orz

Orz can gather the victim's Internet Explorer version.[25]

S0598 P.A.S. Webshell

P.A.S. Webshell can list PHP server configuration details.[26]

S0650 QakBot

QakBot can enumerate a list of installed programs.[27]

S1148 Raccoon Stealer

Raccoon Stealer is capable of identifying running software on victim machines.[28][29]

S0148 RTM

RTM can scan victim drives to look for specific banking software on the machine to determine next actions.[30]

S1099 Samurai

Samurai can check for the presence and version of the .NET framework.[31]

S0445 ShimRatReporter

ShimRatReporter gathered a list of installed software on the infected host.[32]

G1008 SideCopy

SideCopy has collected browser information from a compromised host.[33]

G0121 Sidewinder

Sidewinder has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host.[34][35]

S0623 Siloscape

Siloscape searches for the kubectl binary.[36]

S1124 SocGholish

SocGholish can identify the victim's browser in order to serve the correct fake update page.[37]

S0646 SpicyOmelette

SpicyOmelette can enumerate running software on a targeted system.[38]

S1042 SUGARDUMP

SUGARDUMP can identify Chrome, Opera, Edge Chromium, and Firefox browsers, including version number, on a compromised host.[39]

S1064 SVCReady

SVCReady can collect a list of installed software from an infected host.[40]

S0467 TajMahal

TajMahal has the ability to identify the Internet Explorer (IE) version on an infected host.[41]

G0081 Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper's backdoor could list the infected system's installed software.[42]

G1017 Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has queried the Registry on compromised systems for information on installed software.[43][44]

G0124 Windigo

Windigo has used a script to detect installed software on targeted systems.[45]

G0112 Windshift

Windshift has used malware to identify installed software.[46]

G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has utilized the PowerShell script Get-DataInfo.ps1 to collect installed backup software information from a compromised machine.[47]

S1065 Woody RAT

Woody RAT can collect .NET, PowerShell, and Python information from an infected host.[48]

S0658 XCSSET

XCSSET uses ps aux with the grep command to enumerate common browsers and system processes potentially impacting XCSSET's exfiltration capabilities.[49]

Mitigations

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment.

DS0018 Firewall Firewall Enumeration

Monitor for an extracted list of available firewalls and/or their associated settings/rules (ex: Azure Network Firewall CLI Show commands)

Firewall Metadata

Monitor for contextual data about a firewall and activity around it such as name, policy, or status

DS0009 Process OS API Execution

Monitor for API calls that may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment.

Process Creation

Monitor newly executed processes that may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment.

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