横向工具传输指攻击者在已控网络内部跨系统分发恶意工具或攻击载荷的行为,通常利用SMB、RDP等合法协议或scp、rsync等系统工具实现。传统检测手段通过监控异常文件传输行为(如非工作时间的大文件传输)、分析协议载荷特征(如SMB协议中的可疑文件扩展名)以及追踪多主机间的相同文件哈希来实现威胁发现。防御方可采用网络分段、协议白名单、文件完整性监控等措施限制横向传输活动。
为规避传统检测机制,攻击者发展出多维度的隐蔽传输技术,通过协议滥用、文件特征消除、云服务劫持及内存操作等手段,将工具传输行为深度融入正常业务流量。这些技术突破传统攻击链的线性特征,构建出分布式、动态化、无特征的隐蔽传输体系,显著提升防御方识别与阻断的难度。
当前隐蔽传输技术的核心演进路径体现为"环境融合"与"信任滥用"。攻击者不再追求协议层对抗,而是深度挖掘目标网络中的合法传输机制:协议隧道化传输将恶意流量伪装成视频流、软件更新等业务数据,利用协议容错性实现隐蔽传输;文件分片混淆传输通过密码学与传输路径的协同设计,破坏文件完整性与行为关联性;内存驻留技术更是彻底规避文件系统交互,直接在内存维度完成攻击闭环。三类技术的共性在于突破传统"恶意特征-检测规则"的对抗范式,转而通过业务上下文适配、信任链渗透、攻击生命周期压缩等策略,实现工具传输的"无痕化"。
隐蔽传输技术的发展使得传统基于签名检测、协议分析的防御体系面临系统性失效风险。防御方需构建网络流量行为基线分析、云服务异常操作检测、内存攻击感知等新型能力,同时加强身份凭证保护与最小权限管控,通过零信任架构削弱攻击者的横向移动能力。
| 效应类型 | 是否存在 |
|---|---|
| 特征伪装 | ✅ |
| 行为透明 | ❌ |
| 数据遮蔽 | ✅ |
| 时空释痕 | ❌ |
攻击者通过协议封装、文件格式仿冒等手段,使传输流量在协议特征、文件类型等维度与合法业务数据高度一致。例如将恶意DLL伪装成视频文件扩展名并通过HTTP传输,或使用数字证书签名云存储中的恶意文档,使得防御方难以通过表面特征识别恶意负载。
采用传输通道加密(如TLS、IPSec)与载荷加密(如AES-CTR)双重保障,确保工具传输内容不可解析。在内存驻留传输中,还通过即时解密与密钥擦除机制实现数据痕迹的瞬时性,进一步阻碍取证分析。
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C0028 | 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team moved their tools laterally within the corporate network and between the ICS and corporate network. [1] |
| C0025 | 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack |
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used |
| C0034 | 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a Group Policy Object (GPO) to copy CaddyWiper's executable |
| G1030 | Agrius |
Agrius downloaded some payloads for follow-on execution from legitimate filesharing services such as |
| G1007 | Aoqin Dragon |
Aoqin Dragon has spread malware in target networks by copying modules to folders masquerading as removable devices.[5] |
| G0050 | APT32 |
APT32 has deployed tools after moving laterally using administrative accounts.[6] |
| G0096 | APT41 |
APT41 uses remote shares to move and remotely execute payloads during lateral movemement.[7] |
| S0190 | BITSAdmin |
BITSAdmin can be used to create BITS Jobs to upload and/or download files from SMB file servers.[8] |
| S1068 | BlackCat |
BlackCat can replicate itself across connected servers via |
| C0015 | C0015 |
During C0015, the threat actors used WMI to load Cobalt Strike onto additional hosts within a compromised network.[10] |
| C0018 | C0018 |
During C0018, the threat actors transferred the SoftPerfect Network Scanner and other tools to machines in the network using AnyDesk and PDQ Deploy.[11][12] |
| G0114 | Chimera |
Chimera has copied tools between compromised hosts using SMB.[13] |
| S0106 | cmd |
cmd can be used to copy files to/from a remotely connected internal system.[14] |
| S0062 | DustySky |
DustySky searches for network drives and removable media and duplicates itself onto them.[15] |
| G1003 | Ember Bear |
Ember Bear retrieves follow-on payloads direct from adversary-owned infrastructure for deployment on compromised hosts.[16] |
| S0367 | Emotet |
Emotet has copied itself to remote systems using the |
| S0404 | esentutl |
esentutl can be used to copy files to/from a remote share.[18] |
| S0361 | Expand |
Expand can be used to download or upload a file over a network share.[19] |
| G0051 | FIN10 |
FIN10 has deployed Meterpreter stagers and SplinterRAT instances in the victim network after moving laterally.[20] |
| S0095 | ftp |
ftp may be abused by adversaries to transfer tools or files between systems within a compromised environment.[21][22] |
| G0093 | GALLIUM |
GALLIUM has used PsExec to move laterally between hosts in the target network.[23] |
| S0698 | HermeticWizard |
HermeticWizard can copy files to other machines on a compromised network.[24] |
| C0038 | HomeLand Justice |
During HomeLand Justice, threat actors initiated a process named Mellona.exe to spread the ROADSWEEP file encryptor and a persistence script to a list of internal machines.[25] |
| G1032 | INC Ransom |
INC Ransom has used a rapid succession of copy commands to install a file encryption executable across multiple endpoints within compromised infrastructure.[26][27] |
| S1139 | INC Ransomware |
INC Ransomware can push its encryption executable to multiple endpoints within compromised infrastructure.[26] |
| S1132 | IPsec Helper |
IPsec Helper can download additional payloads from command and control nodes and execute them.[28] |
| S0372 | LockerGoga |
LockerGoga has been observed moving around the victim network via SMB, indicating the actors behind this ransomware are manually copying files form computer to computer instead of self-propagating.[29] |
| S0532 | Lucifer |
Lucifer can use certutil for propagation on Windows hosts within intranets.[30] |
| G0059 | Magic Hound |
Magic Hound has copied tools within a compromised network using RDP.[31] |
| S0457 | Netwalker |
Operators deploying Netwalker have used psexec to copy the Netwalker payload across accessible systems.[32] |
| S0365 | Olympic Destroyer |
Olympic Destroyer attempts to copy itself to remote machines on the network.[33] |
| C0014 | Operation Wocao |
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used SMB to copy files to and from target systems.[34] |
| S1017 | OutSteel |
OutSteel can download the Saint Bot malware for follow-on execution.[35] |
| S0029 | PsExec |
PsExec can be used to download or upload a file over a network share.[36] |
| G0034 | Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has used |
| S0140 | Shamoon |
Shamoon attempts to copy itself to remote machines on the network.[38] |
| S0603 | Stuxnet |
Stuxnet uses an RPC server that contains a file dropping routine and support for payload version updates for P2P communications within a victim network.[39] |
| G0010 | Turla |
Turla RPC backdoors can be used to transfer files to/from victim machines on the local network.[40][41] |
| G1017 | Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has copied web shells between servers in targeted environments.[42] |
| S0366 | WannaCry |
WannaCry attempts to copy itself to remote computers after gaining access via an SMB exploit.[43] |
| G0102 | Wizard Spider |
Wizard Spider has used stolen credentials to copy tools into the |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1037 | Filter Network Traffic |
Consider using the host firewall to restrict file sharing communications such as SMB. [45] |
| M1031 | Network Intrusion Prevention |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. [46] |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files |
| DS0022 | File | File Creation |
Monitor newly constructed files to/from a lateral tool transfer |
| File Metadata |
Monitor for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts. |
||
| DS0023 | Named Pipe | Named Pipe Metadata |
Monitor for contextual data about named pipes on the system. |
| DS0033 | Network Share | Network Share Access |
Monitor for unexpected network share access, such as files transferred between shares within a network using protocols such as SMB. |
| DS0029 | Network Traffic | Network Traffic Content |
Monitor for unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious Note: Analytic Event Type is for Zeek but can also be implemented in other Network Analysis Frameworks by parsing & decoding captured SMB2 network traffic. From a network traffic capture standpoint, it’s important to capture the right traffic for this type of detection to function (e.g., all endpoint to endpoint if possible or workstation to server and workstation to workstation). As such, it is helpful to have a centralized server area where it is possible to monitor communications between servers and endpoints. |
| Network Traffic Flow |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware. |
||
| DS0009 | Process | Process Creation |
Monitor newly constructed processes that assist in lateral tool transfers. |