| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | 伪装: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
NOKKI is written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\svServiceUpdate.exe prior being executed in a new process in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate folder and file.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | 反混淆/解码文件或信息 | ||
| Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | 启动或登录自动启动执行: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
NOKKI has established persistence by writing the payload to the Registry key |
| Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | 应用层协议: Web Protocols | |
| .002 | 应用层协议: File Transfer Protocols | |||
| Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | 数据分段: Local Data Staging |
NOKKI can collect data from the victim and stage it in |
| Enterprise | T1027 | 混淆文件或信息 | ||
| Enterprise | T1070 | .004 | 移除指标: File Deletion | |
| Enterprise | T1218 | .011 | 系统二进制代理执行: Rundll32 | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | 系统信息发现 |
NOKKI can gather information on drives and the operating system on the victim’s machine.[1] |
|
| Enterprise | T1033 | 系统所有者/用户发现 |
NOKKI can collect the username from the victim’s machine.[1] |
|
| Enterprise | T1124 | 系统时间发现 |
NOKKI can collect the current timestamp of the victim's machine.[1] |
|
| Enterprise | T1016 | 系统网络配置发现 | ||
| Enterprise | T1105 | 输入工具传输 | ||
| Enterprise | T1056 | .004 | 输入捕获: Credential API Hooking |
NOKKI uses the Windows call SetWindowsHookEx and begins injecting it into every GUI process running on the victim's machine.[1] |