| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1046.001 | 分布式代理节点轮询探测 |
| T1046.002 | 协议模拟交互探测 |
网络服务发现是攻击者识别目标网络中可用服务及其配置信息的关键侦察技术,通常涉及端口扫描、协议探测和拓扑映射等操作。攻击者通过获取运行中的服务类型、版本及关联漏洞信息,为后续攻击链构建提供支撑。传统检测手段主要依赖流量异常分析(如端口扫描频率检测)、协议合规性验证(如非常规协议交互识别)以及云API调用审计等手段进行防御,通过关联多源日志识别可疑服务探测行为。
为规避传统检测机制,攻击者发展出新型隐匿式服务发现技术,通过分布式资源调度、协议语义模拟及云平台特性滥用等策略,将服务探测行为解构为合法网络交互或管理操作,在维持侦察效能的同时实现行为隐匿,形成难以被传统安全体系感知的"隐形侦察"能力。
当前网络服务发现匿迹技术的核心演进路径聚焦于侦察行为的业务化融合与资源抽象化利用。攻击者通过多维度技术重构突破传统检测边界:分布式代理轮询技术将集中式扫描转化为地理分散的异步探测,利用代理网络的动态切换特性破坏源地址关联分析;协议模拟探测通过构建协议状态机实现应用层交互的深度伪装,使服务识别过程完全隐藏在业务合规流量中。技术的共性在于突破协议指纹识别和流量统计检测的传统对抗维度,通过将攻击行为嵌入更高层级的业务上下文或管理流程,实现侦察活动的"白盒化"改造,使得安全设备难以在合法业务流中分离出恶意意图。
匿迹技术的演进导致基于流量特征和API调用频次的传统检测模型面临失效风险,防御方需构建云网融合检测体系,实施协议交互语义分析、API操作意图识别,并强化云服务身份凭证的动态鉴权机制,通过多维行为画像技术识别异常服务发现模式。
| 效应类型 | 是否存在 |
|---|---|
| 特征伪装 | ✅ |
| 行为透明 | ❌ |
| 数据遮蔽 | ❌ |
| 时空释痕 | ✅ |
攻击者通过深度协议模拟和云API调用伪装,将服务发现流量特征与合法业务流量高度融合。例如在协议模拟探测中精确复制目标网络主流应用的交互流程,使探测报文在应用层表现出完整业务语义;在云API劫持中利用合规接口参数构造查询请求,使得恶意探测被记录为正常管理操作,实现攻击特征的本质性伪装。
分布式代理轮询技术通过全球节点网络实施低频次探测,将传统高密度扫描行为分解为长周期、跨地域的离散请求。每个代理节点执行探测任务后即进入静默状态,同时通过动态IP池轮换机制破坏攻击源的空间关联性,使得服务发现特征被稀释在正常跨国业务流量和云平台运维操作中,传统基于短时窗口的检测策略难以有效捕获。
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G1030 | Agrius |
Agrius used the open-source port scanner |
| G0050 | APT32 |
APT32 performed network scanning on the network to search for open ports, services, OS finger-printing, and other vulnerabilities.[2] |
| G0087 | APT39 |
APT39 has used CrackMapExec and a custom port scanner known as BLUETORCH for network scanning.[3][4] |
| G0096 | APT41 |
APT41 used a malware variant called WIDETONE to conduct port scans on specified subnets.[5] |
| S0093 | Backdoor.Oldrea |
Backdoor.Oldrea can use a network scanning module to identify ICS-related ports.[6] |
| G0135 | BackdoorDiplomacy |
BackdoorDiplomacy has used SMBTouch, a vulnerability scanner, to determine whether a target is vulnerable to EternalBlue malware.[7] |
| S1081 | BADHATCH |
BADHATCH can check for open ports on a computer by establishing a TCP connection.[8] |
| S0089 | BlackEnergy |
BlackEnergy has conducted port scans on a host.[9] |
| G0098 | BlackTech |
BlackTech has used the SNScan tool to find other potential targets on victim networks.[10] |
| S1063 | Brute Ratel C4 |
Brute Ratel C4 can conduct port scanning against targeted systems.[11] |
| C0018 | C0018 |
During C0018, the threat actors used the SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network scanning.[12] |
| C0027 | C0027 |
During C0027, used RustScan to scan for open ports on targeted ESXi appliances.[13] |
| S0572 | Caterpillar WebShell |
Caterpillar WebShell has a module to use a port scanner on a system.[14] |
| G0114 | Chimera |
Chimera has used the |
| S0020 | China Chopper |
China Chopper's server component can spider authentication portals.[16] |
| G0080 | Cobalt Group |
Cobalt Group leveraged an open-source tool called SoftPerfect Network Scanner to perform network scanning.[17][18][19] |
| S0154 | Cobalt Strike |
Cobalt Strike can perform port scans from an infected host.[20][21][22] |
| S0608 | Conficker | |
| C0004 | CostaRicto |
During CostaRicto, the threat actors employed nmap and pscan to scan target environments.[24] |
| G0105 | DarkVishnya |
DarkVishnya performed port scanning to obtain the list of active services.[25] |
| G1003 | Ember Bear |
Ember Bear has used tools such as NMAP for remote system discovery and enumeration in victim environments.[26] |
| S0363 | Empire | |
| G1016 | FIN13 |
FIN13 has utilized |
| G0037 | FIN6 |
FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft's built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.[30] |
| G0117 | Fox Kitten |
Fox Kitten has used tools including NMAP to conduct broad scanning to identify open ports.[31][32] |
| S1144 | FRP |
As part of load balancing FRP can set |
| S0061 | HDoor | |
| S0698 | HermeticWizard |
HermeticWizard has the ability to scan ports on a compromised network.[35] |
| S0601 | Hildegard |
Hildegard has used masscan to look for kubelets in the internal Kubernetes network.[36] |
| C0038 | HomeLand Justice |
During HomeLand Justice, threat actors executed the Advanced Port Scanner tool on compromised systems.[37][38] |
| G1032 | INC Ransom |
INC Ransom has used NETSCAN.EXE for internal reconnaissance.[39][40] |
| S0604 | Industroyer |
Industroyer uses a custom port scanner to map out a network.[41] |
| S0260 | InvisiMole |
InvisiMole can scan the network for open ports and vulnerable instances of RDP and SMB protocols.[42] |
| S0250 | Koadic |
Koadic can scan for open TCP ports on the target network.[43] |
| G0032 | Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has used nmap from a router VM to scan ports on systems within the restricted segment of an enterprise network.[44] |
| G0077 | Leafminer |
Leafminer scanned network services to search for vulnerabilities in the victim system.[45] |
| S0532 | Lucifer |
Lucifer can scan for open ports including TCP ports 135 and 1433.[46] |
| G0059 | Magic Hound |
Magic Hound has used KPortScan 3.0 to perform SMB, RDP, and LDAP scanning.[47] |
| G0045 | menuPass |
menuPass has used tcping.exe, similar to Ping, to probe port status on systems of interest.[48] |
| S1146 | MgBot |
MgBot includes modules for performing HTTP and server service scans.[49] |
| S0233 | MURKYTOP |
MURKYTOP has the capability to scan for open ports on hosts in a connected network.[16] |
| G0019 | Naikon |
Naikon has used the LadonGo scanner to scan target networks.[50] |
| S0590 | NBTscan | |
| G0049 | OilRig |
OilRig has used the publicly available tool SoftPerfect Network Scanner as well as a custom tool called GOLDIRONY to conduct network scanning.[53] |
| C0014 | Operation Wocao |
During Operation Wocao, threat actors scanned for open ports and used nbtscan to find NETBIOS nameservers.[54] |
| S0598 | P.A.S. Webshell |
P.A.S. Webshell can scan networks for open ports and listening services.[55] |
| S0683 | Peirates |
Peirates can initiate a port scan against a given IP address.[56] |
| S0378 | PoshC2 | |
| S0192 | Pupy | |
| S0583 | Pysa |
Pysa can perform network reconnaissance using the Advanced Port Scanner tool.[59] |
| S0458 | Ramsay |
Ramsay can scan for systems that are vulnerable to the EternalBlue exploit.[60][61] |
| G1039 | RedCurl | |
| S0125 | Remsec |
Remsec has a plugin that can perform ARP scanning as well as port scanning.[63] |
| G0106 | Rocke |
Rocke conducted scanning for exposed TCP port 7001 as well as SSH and Redis servers.[64][65] |
| S1073 | Royal |
Royal can scan the network interfaces of targeted systems.[66] |
| S0692 | SILENTTRINITY |
SILENTTRINITY can scan for open ports on a compromised machine.[67] |
| S0374 | SpeakUp |
SpeakUp checks for availability of specific ports on servers.[68] |
| G0039 | Suckfly |
Suckfly the victim's internal network for hosts with ports 8080, 5900, and 40 open.[69] |
| G0139 | TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has used masscan to search for open Docker API ports and Kubernetes clusters.[70][36][71] TeamTNT has also used malware that utilizes zmap and zgrab to search for vulnerable services in cloud environments.[72] |
| G0027 | Threat Group-3390 |
Threat Group-3390 actors use the Hunter tool to conduct network service discovery for vulnerable systems.[73][74] |
| G0081 | Tropic Trooper |
Tropic Trooper used |
| G1017 | Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for network service discovery.[77] |
| S0341 | Xbash | |
| S0117 | XTunnel |
XTunnel is capable of probing the network for open ports.[79] |
| S0412 | ZxShell |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1042 | Disable or Remove Feature or Program |
Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed to prevent risk of discovery and potential exploitation. |
| M1031 | Network Intrusion Prevention |
Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. |
| M1030 | Network Segmentation |
Ensure proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0025 | Cloud Service | Cloud Service Enumeration |
Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.Normal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment. |
| DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. |
| DS0029 | Network Traffic | Network Traffic Flow |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. It should be noted that when a host/ port/ service scan is performed from a compromised machine, a single machine makes multiple calls to other hosts in the network to identify live hosts and services. After compromising an initial machine, adversaries commonly attempt to laterally move across the network. The first step to attempt the Lateral Movement often involves conducting host identification, port and service scans on the internal network via the compromised machine using tools such as Nmap, Cobalt Strike, etc. Note: It should be noted that when a host/ port/ service scan is performed from a compromised machine, a single machine makes multiple calls to other hosts in the network to identify live hosts and services. This can be detected using the following query Analytic 1 - Identifying Port Scanning Activity
|