TeamTNT

TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]

ID: G0139
Contributors: Will Thomas, Cyjax; Darin Smith, Cisco
Version: 1.3
Created: 01 October 2021
Last Modified: 16 September 2024

Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1014 Rootkit

TeamTNT has used rootkits such as the open-source Diamorphine rootkit and their custom bots to hide cryptocurrency mining activities on the machine.[6] [10]

Enterprise T1595 .001 主动扫描: Scanning IP Blocks

TeamTNT has scanned specific lists of target IP addresses.[6]

.002 主动扫描: Vulnerability Scanning

TeamTNT has scanned for vulnerabilities in IoT devices and other related resources such as the Docker API.[6]

Enterprise T1036 伪装

TeamTNT has disguised their scripts with docker-related file names.[10]

.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location

TeamTNT has replaced .dockerd and .dockerenv with their own scripts and cryptocurrency mining software.[10]

Enterprise T1543 .002 创建或修改系统进程: Systemd Service

TeamTNT has established persistence through the creation of a cryptocurrency mining system service using systemctl.[6][10]

.003 创建或修改系统进程: Windows Service

TeamTNT has used malware that adds cryptocurrency miners as a service.[7]

Enterprise T1136 .001 创建账户: Local Account

TeamTNT has created local privileged users on victim machines.[3]

Enterprise T1140 反混淆/解码文件或信息

TeamTNT has used a script that decodes a Base64-encoded version of WeaveWorks Scope.[10]

Enterprise T1547 .001 启动或登录自动启动执行: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

TeamTNT has added batch scripts to the startup folder.[7]

Enterprise T1059 .001 命令与脚本解释器: PowerShell

TeamTNT has executed PowerShell commands in batch scripts.[7]

.003 命令与脚本解释器: Windows Command Shell

TeamTNT has used batch scripts to download tools and executing cryptocurrency miners.[7]

.004 命令与脚本解释器: Unix Shell

TeamTNT has used shell scripts for execution.[6][10]

.009 命令与脚本解释器: Cloud API

TeamTNT has leveraged AWS CLI to enumerate cloud environments with compromised credentials.[11]

Enterprise T1120 外围设备发现

TeamTNT has searched for attached VGA devices using lspci.[10]

Enterprise T1133 外部远程服务

TeamTNT has used open-source tools such as Weave Scope to target exposed Docker API ports and gain initial access to victim environments.[3][10] TeamTNT has also targeted exposed kubelets for Kubernetes environments.[5]

Enterprise T1562 .001 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify Tools

TeamTNT has disabled and uninstalled security tools such as Alibaba, Tencent, and BMC cloud monitoring agents on cloud-based infrastructure.[7][10]

.004 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify System Firewall

TeamTNT has disabled iptables.[8]

Enterprise T1613 容器与资源发现

TeamTNT has checked for running containers with docker ps and for specific container names with docker inspect.[6] TeamTNT has also searched for Kubernetes pods running in a local network.[10]

Enterprise T1609 容器管理命令

TeamTNT executed Hildegard through the kubelet API run command and by executing commands on running containers.[5]

Enterprise T1071 应用层协议

TeamTNT has used an IRC bot for C2 communications.[6]

.001 Web Protocols

TeamTNT has the curl command to send credentials over HTTP and the curl and wget commands to download new software.[3][4][10] TeamTNT has also used a custom user agent HTTP header in shell scripts.[6]

Enterprise T1587 .001 开发能力: Malware

TeamTNT has developed custom malware such as Hildegard.[5]

Enterprise T1074 .001 数据分段: Local Data Staging

TeamTNT has aggregated collected credentials in text files before exfiltrating.[10]

Enterprise T1083 文件和目录发现

TeamTNT has used a script that checks /proc/*/environ for environment variables related to AWS.[10]

Enterprise T1222 .002 文件和目录权限修改: Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification

TeamTNT has modified the permissions on binaries with chattr.[6][10]

Enterprise T1608 .001 暂存能力: Upload Malware

TeamTNT has uploaded backdoored Docker images to Docker Hub.[2]

Enterprise T1048 替代协议渗出

TeamTNT has sent locally staged files with collected credentials to C2 servers using cURL.[10]

Enterprise T1552 .001 未加密凭证: Credentials In Files

TeamTNT has searched for unsecured AWS credentials and Docker API credentials.[4][6][10]

.004 未加密凭证: Private Keys

TeamTNT has searched for unsecured SSH keys.[4][6]

.005 未加密凭证: Cloud Instance Metadata API

TeamTNT has queried the AWS instance metadata service for credentials.[6][10]

Enterprise T1027 .002 混淆文件或信息: Software Packing

TeamTNT has used UPX and Ezuri packer to pack its binaries.[6]

.013 混淆文件或信息: Encrypted/Encoded File

TeamTNT has encrypted its binaries via AES and encoded files using Base64.[6][8]

Enterprise T1204 .003 用户执行: Malicious Image

TeamTNT has relied on users to download and execute malicious Docker images.[2]

Enterprise T1070 .002 移除指标: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs

TeamTNT has removed system logs from /var/log/syslog.[8]

.003 移除指标: Clear Command History

TeamTNT has cleared command history with history -c.[6][10]

.004 移除指标: File Deletion

TeamTNT has used a payload that removes itself after running. TeamTNT also has deleted locally staged files for collecting credentials or scan results for local IP addresses after exfiltrating them.[7][10]

Enterprise T1082 系统信息发现

TeamTNT has searched for system version, architecture, disk partition, logical volume, and hostname information.[7][10]

Enterprise T1569 系统服务

TeamTNT has created system services to execute cryptocurrency mining software.[10]

Enterprise T1007 系统服务发现

TeamTNT has searched for services such as Alibaba Cloud Security's aliyun service and BMC Helix Cloud Security's bmc-agent service in order to disable them.[10]

Enterprise T1049 系统网络连接发现

TeamTNT has run netstat -anp to search for rival malware connections.[6] TeamTNT has also used libprocesshider to modify /etc/ld.so.preload.[7]

Enterprise T1016 系统网络配置发现

TeamTNT has enumerated the host machine’s IP address.[6]

Enterprise T1102 网络服务

TeamTNT has leveraged iplogger.org to send collected data back to C2.[8][10]

Enterprise T1046 网络服务发现

TeamTNT has used masscan to search for open Docker API ports and Kubernetes clusters.[4][5][10] TeamTNT has also used malware that utilizes zmap and zgrab to search for vulnerable services in cloud environments.[1]

Enterprise T1583 .001 获取基础设施: Domains

TeamTNT has obtained domains to host their payloads.[1]

Enterprise T1098 .004 账号操控: SSH Authorized Keys

TeamTNT has added RSA keys in authorized_keys.[8][10]

Enterprise T1496 .001 资源劫持: Compute Hijacking

TeamTNT has deployed XMRig Docker images to mine cryptocurrency.[2][4] TeamTNT has also infected Docker containers and Kubernetes clusters with XMRig, and used RainbowMiner and lolMiner for mining cryptocurrency.[10]

Enterprise T1518 .001 软件发现: Security Software Discovery

TeamTNT has searched for security products on infected machines.[7][10]

Enterprise T1105 输入工具传输

TeamTNT has the curl and wget commands as well as batch scripts to download new tools.[3][10]

Enterprise T1057 进程发现

TeamTNT has searched for rival malware and removes it if found.[6] TeamTNT has also searched for running processes containing the strings aliyun or liyun to identify machines running Alibaba Cloud Security tools.[10]

Enterprise T1021 .004 远程服务: SSH

TeamTNT has used SSH to connect back to victim machines.[3] TeamTNT has also used SSH to transfer tools and payloads onto victim hosts and execute them.[10]

Enterprise T1219 远程访问软件

TeamTNT has established tmate sessions for C2 communications.[5][10]

Enterprise T1611 逃逸至主机

TeamTNT has deployed privileged containers that mount the filesystem of victim machine.[3][8]

Enterprise T1610 部署容器

TeamTNT has deployed different types of containers into victim environments to facilitate execution.[3][6] TeamTNT has also transferred cryptocurrency mining software to Kubernetes clusters discovered within local IP address ranges.[10]

Software

ID Name References Techniques
S0601 Hildegard [5] Rootkit, 伪装: Masquerade Task or Service, 创建或修改系统进程: Systemd Service, 创建账户: Local Account, 劫持执行流: Dynamic Linker Hijacking, 反混淆/解码文件或信息, 命令与脚本解释器: Unix Shell, 外部远程服务, 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify Tools, 容器与资源发现, 容器管理命令, 应用层协议, 未加密凭证: Private Keys, 未加密凭证: Credentials In Files, 未加密凭证: Cloud Instance Metadata API, 权限提升漏洞利用, 混淆文件或信息: Software Packing, 混淆文件或信息: Encrypted/Encoded File, 移除指标: File Deletion, 移除指标: Clear Command History, 系统信息发现, 网络服务, 网络服务发现, 资源劫持: Compute Hijacking, 输入工具传输, 远程访问软件, 逃逸至主机
S0349 LaZagne [7] 从密码存储中获取凭证: Windows Credential Manager, 从密码存储中获取凭证: Credentials from Web Browsers, 从密码存储中获取凭证, 从密码存储中获取凭证: Keychain, 操作系统凭证转储: LSA Secrets, 操作系统凭证转储: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, 操作系统凭证转储: LSASS Memory, 操作系统凭证转储: Cached Domain Credentials, 操作系统凭证转储: Proc Filesystem, 未加密凭证: Credentials In Files
S0179 MimiPenguin [1] 操作系统凭证转储: Proc Filesystem
S0683 Peirates [12] 云存储对象发现, 从云存储获取数据, 使用备用认证材料: Application Access Token, 容器与资源发现, 容器管理命令, 有效账户: Cloud Accounts, 未加密凭证: Container API, 未加密凭证: Cloud Instance Metadata API, 窃取应用访问令牌, 网络服务发现, 逃逸至主机, 部署容器

References