Rootkit是一类通过篡改操作系统底层机制实现恶意组件隐匿的深度持久化技术,其通过劫持系统API调用、操控硬件抽象层等手段,对进程、文件、网络连接等系统对象进行动态过滤与信息伪造。攻击者可以利用Rootkit技术在受害操作系统中植入恶意代码,而不被常规的安全工具或监控系统察觉。由于Rootkit通过操控系统级别的调用来隐蔽自身,其自身的存在通常不容易被检测到,可以长期潜伏在目标系统内。因为Rootkit是在系统内核层或更低层(如固件、MBR)运行,因此它能够对系统监控工具的查询进行干扰,避免了常见的防御措施的检测,防御者难以通过常规手段(如文件系统扫描、进程监控)发现恶意活动,因此攻击者在使用该技术的过程中天然具有较高的隐蔽性。
Rootkit匿迹技术的发展迫使防御体系必须构建跨权限层级的协同检测能力,需融合硬件可信根验证、内存实时取证、行为熵值分析等技术,建立从固件层到应用层的全栈监控体系,同时加强供应链数字证书的全生命周期管理以遏制信任链滥用风险。
| 效应类型 | 是否存在 |
|---|---|
| 特征伪装 | ❌ |
| 行为透明 | ✅ |
| 数据遮蔽 | ❌ |
| 时空释痕 | ❌ |
Rootkit能够深度渗透到操作系统的底层架构中,通过巧妙地劫持和篡改API调用,实现对进程、文件、服务等关键系统元素的隐匿化。即使系统内部正在进行着各种恶意活动,如数据窃取、远程控制指令的执行或系统资源的非法占用,但操作系统所呈现给防御者的信息依旧保持着正常的表象,这使得防御者难以发现攻击者的真实行径。
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0007 | APT28 |
APT28 has used a UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) rootkit known as LoJax.[1][2] |
| G0096 | APT41 | |
| S0484 | Carberp |
Carberp has used user mode rootkit techniques to remain hidden on the system.[5] |
| S0572 | Caterpillar WebShell |
Caterpillar WebShell has a module to use a rootkit on a system.[6] |
| S1105 | COATHANGER |
COATHANGER hooks or replaces multiple legitimate processes and other functions on victim devices.[7] |
| S0502 | Drovorub |
Drovorub has used a kernel module rootkit to hide processes, files, executables, and network artifacts from user space view.[8] |
| S0377 | Ebury |
Ebury acts as a user land rootkit using the SSH service.[9][10] |
| S0047 | Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit |
Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a UEFI BIOS rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team to persist remote access software on some targeted systems.[11] |
| S0394 | HiddenWasp |
HiddenWasp uses a rootkit to hook and implement functions on the system.[12] |
| S0135 | HIDEDRV |
HIDEDRV is a rootkit that hides certain operating system artifacts.[13] |
| S0009 | Hikit | |
| S0601 | Hildegard |
Hildegard has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to overwrite readdir() and readdir64().[16] |
| S0040 | HTRAN |
HTRAN can install a rootkit to hide network connections from the host OS.[17] |
| S0397 | LoJax |
LoJax is a UEFI BIOS rootkit deployed to persist remote access software on some targeted systems.[2] |
| S0012 | PoisonIvy |
PoisonIvy starts a rootkit from a malicious file dropped to disk.[18] |
| S0458 | Ramsay | |
| G0106 | Rocke |
Rocke has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to hook libc functions in order to hide the installed dropper and mining software in process lists.[20] |
| S0468 | Skidmap |
Skidmap is a kernel-mode rootkit that has the ability to hook system calls to hide specific files and fake network and CPU-related statistics to make the CPU load of the infected machine always appear low.[21] |
| S0603 | Stuxnet |
Stuxnet uses a Windows rootkit to mask its binaries and other relevant files.[22] |
| G0139 | TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has used rootkits such as the open-source Diamorphine rootkit and their custom bots to hide cryptocurrency mining activities on the machine.[23] [24] |
| S0221 | Umbreon |
Umbreon hides from defenders by hooking libc function calls, hiding artifacts that would reveal its presence, such as the user account it creates to provide access and undermining strace, a tool often used to identify malware.[25] |
| S0022 | Uroburos |
Uroburos can use its kernel module to prevent its host components from being listed by the targeted system's OS and to mediate requests between user mode and concealed components.[26][27] |
| S0670 | WarzoneRAT |
WarzoneRAT can include a rootkit to hide processes, files, and startup.[28] |
| S0430 | Winnti for Linux |
Winnti for Linux has used a modified copy of the open-source userland rootkit Azazel, named libxselinux.so, to hide the malware's operations and network activity.[29] |
| G0044 | Winnti Group |
Winnti Group used a rootkit to modify typical server functionality.[30] |
| S0027 | Zeroaccess |
Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode rootkit.[31] |
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0016 | Drive | Drive Modification |
Monitor for changes made to drive letters or mount points of data storage devices for unexpected modifications that may be used by rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. |
| DS0022 | File | File Modification |
Monitor for changes and the existence of unrecognized DLLs, drivers, devices, services, and to the MBR. [32] |
| DS0001 | Firmware | Firmware Modification |
Monitor for changes made to firmware for unexpected modifications to settings and/or data that may be used by rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. |