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网络共享发现

ID Name
T1135.001 合法工具隐蔽枚举
T1135.002 低频分布式共享嗅探
T1135.003 加密通道共享探测

网络共享发现是攻击者通过枚举网络共享资源定位敏感数据存储位置和潜在横向移动路径的关键技术，主要依赖SMB、NFS等协议的特性实施探测。传统检测手段通过监控异常共享查询请求（如短时间内大量net view命令）、分析SMB协议流量模式（如非常规树连接操作）以及审计安全日志中的可疑账户行为来实现威胁识别。防御方通常采用网络分段、共享访问权限最小化和协议深度检测等策略进行防护。

为应对日益精细化的检测体系，攻击者进化出多种隐蔽式共享发现技术，通过工具滥用、协议混淆和分布式架构等手段，将恶意探测行为深度嵌入正常网络操作流程，显著降低了传统基于行为特征或规则匹配的检测机制效能。

当前隐蔽式共享发现技术的核心实现逻辑聚焦于三个层面：合法上下文构建、加密通信滥用和时空特征重构。合法工具隐蔽枚举技术充分利用系统白名单机制，通过精准复现管理员操作模式，使得恶意行为在进程树、命令行参数和日志记录等维度与正常运维完全一致；低频分布式嗅探采用复杂的时间序列控制算法，使探测节奏动态适配目标网络流量基线，同时通过地理分散架构破坏行为空间关联性；加密通道探测则通过协议栈重构和加密增强，使得网络层仅能观测到加密会话特征而无法获取实质性协议交互内容。三类技术的共性在于突破传统协议特征对抗范式，转向对网络行为上下文环境、系统信任机制和加密通信生态的深度利用，实现了从"协议异常检测"到"行为合法性认证"的防御体系突破。

匿迹技术的发展迫使防御方必须构建多维度行为基线分析能力，结合用户实体行为分析（UEBA）技术识别异常资源访问模式，同时加强加密流量元数据分析，并实施严格的网络共享最小化原则。需建立协议级交互建模能力，通过机器学习识别加密会话中的隐蔽探测特征。

ID: T1135
Sub-techniques:  T1135.001, T1135.002, T1135.003
ⓘ
Tactic: 环境测绘
ⓘ
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Contributors: Praetorian
Version: 3.2
Created: 14 December 2017
Last Modified: 29 September 2023

匿迹效应

效应类型 是否存在
特征伪装 ✅
行为透明 ❌
数据遮蔽 ✅
时空释痕 ✅

特征伪装

攻击者通过协议模拟和工具滥用，将共享发现行为伪装成合法管理操作。例如使用系统内置命令执行查询，使安全设备难以通过进程特征或命令行参数识别恶意意图。将SMB协议封装在加密隧道中，使得网络流量表现出与合法加密业务相同的协议特征，实现攻击行为的深度隐藏。

数据遮蔽

采用端到端加密通道传输共享探测指令和响应数据，利用SMB over QUIC或自定义加密协议对通信内容进行强加密。这使得防御方无法通过流量解密获取共享查询的具体参数和目标路径，仅能观测到加密会话的建立与维持，有效隐藏攻击的关键元数据。

时空释痕

通过分布式节点协同和自适应频率控制，将集中式探测任务分解为低频次、长周期的离散请求。利用全球代理网络动态切换源IP地理位置，使探测流量在时空维度呈现高度分散特征，破坏传统检测系统基于请求密度和IP聚类的分析模型，显著延长攻击行为的潜伏周期。

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1129 Akira

Akira can identify remote file shares for encryption.[1]
G0006 APT1

APT1 listed connected network shares.[2]
G0050 APT32

APT32 used the net view command to show all shares available, including the administrative shares such as C$ and ADMIN$.[3]
G0082 APT38

APT38 has enumerated network shares on a compromised host.[4]
G0087 APT39

APT39 has used the post exploitation tool CrackMapExec to enumerate network shares.[5]
G0096 APT41

APT41 used the net share command as part of network reconnaissance.[6][7]
S0640 Avaddon

Avaddon has enumerated shared folders and mapped volumes.[8]
S1053 AvosLocker

AvosLocker has enumerated shared drives on a compromised network.[9][10]
S0638 Babuk

Babuk has the ability to enumerate network shares.[11]
S0606 Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit enumerates open SMB shares on internal victim networks.[12]
S1081 BADHATCH

BADHATCH can check a user's access to the C$ share on a compromised machine.[13]

S0534 Bazar

Bazar can enumerate shared drives on the domain.[14]
S0570 BitPaymer

BitPaymer can search for network shares on the domain or workgroup using net view .[15]
S1068 BlackCat

BlackCat has the ability to discover network shares on compromised networks.[16][17]
C0015 C0015

During C0015, the threat actors executed the PowerView ShareFinder module to identify open shares.[18]
G0114 Chimera

Chimera has used net share and net view to identify network shares of interest.[19]
S0660 Clambling

Clambling has the ability to enumerate network shares.[20]
S0611 Clop

Clop can enumerate network shares.[21]
S0154 Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can query shared drives on the local system.[22]
S0575 Conti

Conti can enumerate remote open SMB network shares using NetShareEnum().[23][24]
S0488 CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec can enumerate the shared folders and associated permissions for a targeted network.[25]
S0625 Cuba

Cuba can discover shared resources using the NetShareEnum API call.[26]

G0105 DarkVishnya

DarkVishnya scanned the network for public shared folders.[27]
S0616 DEATHRANSOM

DEATHRANSOM has the ability to use loop operations to enumerate network resources.[28]
S0659 Diavol

Diavol has a ENMDSKS command to enumerates available network shares.[29]

G0035 Dragonfly

Dragonfly has identified and browsed file servers in the victim network, sometimes , viewing files pertaining to ICS or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.[30]
S1159 DUSTTRAP

DUSTTRAP can identify and enumerate victim system network shares.[31]
S0367 Emotet

Emotet has enumerated non-hidden network shares using WNetEnumResourceW. [32]
S0363 Empire

Empire can find shared drives on the local system.[33]
G1016 FIN13

FIN13 has executed net view commands for enumeration of open shares on compromised machines.[34][35]
S0618 FIVEHANDS

FIVEHANDS can enumerate network shares and mounted drives on a network.[36]
S0696 Flagpro

Flagpro has been used to execute net view to discover mapped network shares.[37]
S0617 HELLOKITTY

HELLOKITTY has the ability to enumerate network resources.[28]
S0483 IcedID

IcedID has used the net view /all command to show available shares.[38]
G1032 INC Ransom

INC Ransom has used Internet Explorer to view folders on other systems.[39]
S1139 INC Ransomware

INC Ransomware has the ability to check for shared network drives to encrypt.[40]
S0260 InvisiMole

InvisiMole can gather network share information.[41]
S0250 Koadic

Koadic can scan local network for open SMB.[42]
S1075 KOPILUWAK

KOPILUWAK can use netstat and Net to discover network shares.[43]
S0236 Kwampirs

Kwampirs collects a list of network shares with the command net share.[44]
S1160 Latrodectus

Latrodectus can run C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c net view /all to discover network shares.[45][46]
S1141 LunarWeb

LunarWeb can identify shared resources in compromised environments.[47]
S0233 MURKYTOP

MURKYTOP has the capability to retrieve information about shares on remote hosts.[48]
S0039 Net

The net view \remotesystem and net share commands in Net can be used to find shared drives and directories on remote and local systems respectively.[49]
S0365 Olympic Destroyer

Olympic Destroyer will attempt to enumerate mapped network shares to later attempt to wipe all files on those shares.[50]
C0012 Operation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net share command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.[51]
C0014 Operation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered network disks mounted to the system using netstat.[52]
S0165 OSInfo

OSInfo discovers shares on the network[53]
S0013 PlugX

PlugX has a module to enumerate network shares.[54]
S0192 Pupy

Pupy can list local and remote shared drives and folders over SMB.[55]
S0650 QakBot

QakBot can use net share to identify network shares for use in lateral movement.[56][57]
S0686 QuietSieve

QuietSieve can identify and search networked drives for specific file name extensions.[58]
S0458 Ramsay

Ramsay can scan for network drives which may contain documents for collection.[59][60]

S1073 Royal

Royal can enumerate the shared resources of a given IP addresses using the API call NetShareEnum.[61]
S1085 Sardonic

Sardonic has the ability to execute the net view command.[62]
S0444 ShimRat

ShimRat can enumerate connected drives for infected host machines.[63]
S0692 SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can enumerate shares on a compromised host.[64]
G0054 Sowbug

Sowbug listed remote shared drives that were accessible from a victim.[65]
S0603 Stuxnet

Stuxnet enumerates the directories of a network resource.[66]
G0131 Tonto Team

Tonto Team has used tools such as NBTscan to enumerate network shares.[67]
S0266 TrickBot

TrickBot module shareDll/mshareDll discovers network shares via the WNetOpenEnumA API.[68][69]
G0081 Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper used netview to scan target systems for shared resources.[70]
S0612 WastedLocker

WastedLocker can identify network adjacent and accessible drives.[71]
S0689 WhisperGate

WhisperGate can enumerate connected remote logical drives.[72]
G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used the "net view" command to locate mapped network shares.[73]
S0251 Zebrocy

Zebrocy identifies network drives when they are added to victim systems.[74]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1028 Operating System Configuration

Enable Windows Group Policy "Do Not Allow Anonymous Enumeration of SAM Accounts and Shares" security setting to limit users who can enumerate network shares.[75]

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments that may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.
DS0009 Process OS API Execution

Monitor for API calls that may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.
Process Creation

Monitor for newly executed processes that may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.

References

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