APT38

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

ID: G0082
Associated Groups: NICKEL GLADSTONE, BeagleBoyz, Bluenoroff, Stardust Chollima, Sapphire Sleet, COPERNICIUM
Contributors: Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation; Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India; Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India
Version: 3.1
Created: 29 January 2019
Last Modified: 22 January 2025

Associated Group Descriptions

Name Description
NICKEL GLADSTONE

[5]

BeagleBoyz

[1]

Bluenoroff

[4]

Stardust Chollima

[6][7]

Sapphire Sleet

[8]

COPERNICIUM

[8]

Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1005 从本地系统获取数据

APT38 has collected data from a compromised host.[1]

Enterprise T1112 修改注册表

APT38 uses a tool called CLEANTOAD that has the capability to modify Registry keys.[2]

Enterprise T1543 .003 创建或修改系统进程: Windows Service

APT38 has installed a new Windows service to establish persistence.[1]

Enterprise T1115 剪贴板数据

APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to collect data from the clipboard.[2]

Enterprise T1059 .001 命令与脚本解释器: PowerShell

APT38 has used PowerShell to execute commands and other operational tasks.[1]

.003 命令与脚本解释器: Windows Command Shell

APT38 has used a command-line tunneler, NACHOCHEESE, to give them shell access to a victim’s machine.[2]

.005 命令与脚本解释器: Visual Basic

APT38 has used VBScript to execute commands and other operational tasks.[1]

Enterprise T1562 .003 妨碍防御: Impair Command History Logging

APT38 has prepended a space to all of their terminal commands to operate without leaving traces in the HISTCONTROL environment.[1]

.004 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify System Firewall

APT38 have created firewall exemptions on specific ports, including ports 443, 6443, 8443, and 9443.[1]

Enterprise T1071 .001 应用层协议: Web Protocols

APT38 used a backdoor, QUICKRIDE, to communicate to the C2 server over HTTP and HTTPS.[2]

Enterprise T1486 数据加密以实现影响

APT38 has used Hermes ransomware to encrypt files with AES256.[2]

Enterprise T1565 .001 数据操控: Stored Data Manipulation

APT38 has used DYEPACK to create, delete, and alter records in databases used for SWIFT transactions.[2]

.002 数据操控: Transmitted Data Manipulation

APT38 has used DYEPACK to manipulate SWIFT messages en route to a printer.[2]

.003 数据操控: Runtime Data Manipulation

APT38 has used DYEPACK.FOX to manipulate PDF data as it is accessed to remove traces of fraudulent SWIFT transactions from the data displayed to the end user.[2]

Enterprise T1485 数据销毁

APT38 has used a custom secure delete function to make deleted files unrecoverable.[2]

Enterprise T1083 文件和目录发现

APT38 have enumerated files and directories, or searched in specific locations within a compromised host.[1]

Enterprise T1110 暴力破解

APT38 has used brute force techniques to attempt account access when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are unavailable.[1]

Enterprise T1505 .003 服务器软件组件: Web Shell

APT38 has used web shells for persistence or to ensure redundant access.[1]

Enterprise T1106 本机API

APT38 has used the Windows API to execute code within a victim's system.[1]

Enterprise T1217 浏览器信息发现

APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources.[1]

Enterprise T1189 浏览器攻击

APT38 has conducted watering holes schemes to gain initial access to victims.[2][1]

Enterprise T1027 .002 混淆文件或信息: Software Packing

APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium, to pack their implants.[2]

Enterprise T1204 .002 用户执行: Malicious File

APT38 has attempted to lure victims into enabling malicious macros within email attachments.[1]

Enterprise T1561 .002 磁盘擦除: Disk Structure Wipe

APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK to render systems inoperable.[2]

Enterprise T1070 .001 移除指标: Clear Windows Event Logs

APT38 clears Window Event logs and Sysmon logs from the system.[2]

.004 移除指标: File Deletion

APT38 has used a utility called CLOSESHAVE that can securely delete a file from the system. They have also removed malware, tools, or other non-native files used during the intrusion to reduce their footprint or as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.[2][1]

.006 移除指标: Timestomp

APT38 has modified data timestamps to mimic files that are in the same folder on a compromised host.[1]

Enterprise T1218 .001 系统二进制代理执行: Compiled HTML File

APT38 has used CHM files to move concealed payloads.[9]

.011 系统二进制代理执行: Rundll32

APT38 has used rundll32.exe to execute binaries, scripts, and Control Panel Item files and to execute code via proxy to avoid triggering security tools.[1]

Enterprise T1082 系统信息发现

APT38 has attempted to get detailed information about a compromised host, including the operating system, version, patches, hotfixes, and service packs.[1]

Enterprise T1529 系统关机/重启

APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK, which will initiate a system reboot after wiping the victim's MBR.[2]

Enterprise T1033 系统所有者/用户发现

APT38 has identified primary users, currently logged in users, sets of users that commonly use a system, or inactive users.[1]

Enterprise T1569 .002 系统服务: Service Execution

APT38 has created new services or modified existing ones to run executables, commands, or scripts.[1]

Enterprise T1049 系统网络连接发现

APT38 installed a port monitoring tool, MAPMAKER, to print the active TCP connections on the local system.[2]

Enterprise T1135 网络共享发现

APT38 has enumerated network shares on a compromised host.[1]

Enterprise T1588 .002 获取能力: Tool

APT38 has obtained and used open-source tools such as Mimikatz.[10]

Enterprise T1518 .001 软件发现: Security Software Discovery

APT38 has identified security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors installed on a compromised system.[1]

Enterprise T1105 输入工具传输

APT38 used a backdoor, NESTEGG, that has the capability to download and upload files to and from a victim’s machine.[2]

Enterprise T1056 .001 输入捕获: Keylogging

APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to capture keystrokes from the victim’s machine.[2]

Enterprise T1057 进程发现

APT38 leveraged Sysmon to understand the processes, services in the organization.[2]

Enterprise T1566 .001 钓鱼: Spearphishing Attachment

APT38 has conducted spearphishing campaigns using malicious email attachments.[1]

Enterprise T1053 .003 预定任务/作业: Cron

APT38 has used cron to create pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs on a Linux system.[1]

.005 预定任务/作业: Scheduled Task

APT38 has used Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.[1]

Software

ID Name References Techniques
S0334 DarkComet [2] 伪装: Match Legitimate Name or Location, 修改注册表, 剪贴板数据, 启动或登录自动启动执行: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, 命令与脚本解释器, 命令与脚本解释器: Windows Command Shell, 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify System Firewall, 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify Tools, 应用层协议: Web Protocols, 混淆文件或信息: Software Packing, 系统信息发现, 系统所有者/用户发现, 视频捕获, 输入工具传输, 输入捕获: Keylogging, 进程发现, 远程服务: Remote Desktop Protocol, 音频捕获
S0593 ECCENTRICBANDWAGON [1] 命令与脚本解释器: Windows Command Shell, 屏幕捕获, 数据分段: Local Data Staging, 混淆文件或信息, 移除指标: File Deletion, 输入捕获: Keylogging
S0376 HOPLIGHT [1] Windows管理规范, 事件触发执行: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription, 代理, 使用备用认证材料: Pass the Hash, 修改注册表, 命令与脚本解释器: Windows Command Shell, 回退信道, 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify System Firewall, 操作系统凭证转储: Security Account Manager, 数据编码: Standard Encoding, 文件和目录发现, 查询注册表, 系统信息发现, 系统时间发现, 系统服务: Service Execution, 设备驱动程序探测, 输入工具传输, 进程注入, 通过C2信道渗出, 非标准端口
S0607 KillDisk [10] Data Destruction, Indicator Removal on Host, Loss of View, Service Stop, 伪装: Masquerade Task or Service, 共享模块, 数据加密以实现影响, 数据销毁, 文件和目录发现, 服务停止, 本机API, 混淆文件或信息, 磁盘擦除: Disk Structure Wipe, 移除指标: Clear Windows Event Logs, 移除指标: File Deletion, 系统信息发现, 系统关机/重启, 访问令牌操控, 进程发现
S0002 Mimikatz [2] 从密码存储中获取凭证, 从密码存储中获取凭证: Credentials from Web Browsers, 从密码存储中获取凭证: Windows Credential Manager, 伪造域控制器, 使用备用认证材料: Pass the Hash, 使用备用认证材料: Pass the Ticket, 启动或登录自动启动执行: Security Support Provider, 操作系统凭证转储: DCSync, 操作系统凭证转储: Security Account Manager, 操作系统凭证转储: LSASS Memory, 操作系统凭证转储: LSA Secrets, 未加密凭证: Private Keys, 窃取或伪造Kerberos票据: Golden Ticket, 窃取或伪造Kerberos票据: Silver Ticket, 窃取或伪造身份认证证书, 访问令牌操控: SID-History Injection, 账号操控
S0039 Net [2] 创建账户: Local Account, 创建账户: Domain Account, 密码策略发现, 权限组发现: Domain Groups, 权限组发现: Local Groups, 移除指标: Network Share Connection Removal, 系统时间发现, 系统服务: Service Execution, 系统服务发现, 系统网络连接发现, 网络共享发现, 账号发现: Domain Account, 账号发现: Local Account, 账号操控: Additional Local or Domain Groups, 远程服务: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, 远程系统发现

References