远程服务漏洞利用

远程服务漏洞利用指攻击者通过利用网络服务的编程缺陷或配置错误,在未授权情况下执行恶意代码,通常用于横向移动和权限提升。传统检测方法侧重于识别异常进程行为(如非预期子进程创建)、内存注入痕迹,以及网络流量中的已知漏洞特征模式(如特定偏移量的缓冲区溢出尝试)。防御措施包括强化服务配置、及时修补漏洞,以及部署基于行为分析的端点检测系统。

ID: T1210
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic: 横向渗透
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
System Requirements: Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible from the internal network.
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: ExtraHop
Version: 1.1
Created: 18 April 2018
Last Modified: 24 February 2022

匿迹效应

效应类型 是否存在
特征伪装
行为透明
数据遮蔽
时空释痕

特征伪装

攻击者通过精确模拟合法协议交互模式和系统调用序列,使漏洞利用流量在协议语法层面与正常业务流量完全一致。例如将溢出载荷嵌入符合RFC规范的HTTP分块传输编码中,或利用RDP虚拟通道特性传输加密攻击指令,实现网络流量和系统行为的表面合规化。

行为透明

采用零日漏洞或高级内存攻击手法(如基于物理地址的攻击),突破传统基于漏洞特征库的检测体系。攻击者利用未公开的漏洞利用链和硬件层缺陷,使得防御方缺乏有效检测特征,形成“无特征可检测”的透明化攻击效果。

数据遮蔽

通过SSL/TLS加密、自定义协议封装以及内存加密加载技术,对漏洞利用代码和通信内容实施多层加密。例如使用AES-GCM加密传输分段载荷,或利用DPAPI接口加密内存中的Shellcode,使得网络流量和内存数据均呈现加密随机性,阻断基于内容解析的检测。

时空释痕

采用分布式攻击节点和低频触发策略,将漏洞利用行为分散在数周甚至数月的运维周期中。例如每月仅激活一次横向移动漏洞利用,或通过全球CDN节点随机选择攻击源,使攻击特征被稀释在长期运维数据和全球化网络流量中,破坏防御系统的时空关联分析能力。

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0007 APT28

APT28 exploited a Windows SMB Remote Code Execution Vulnerability to conduct lateral movement.[1][2][3]

S0606 Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit used the EternalRomance SMB exploit to spread through victim networks.[4]

S0608 Conficker

Conficker exploited the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability for remote code execution through a crafted RPC request.[5]

G0035 Dragonfly

Dragonfly has exploited a Windows Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) to obtain access to Windows Active Directory servers.[6]

G1006 Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca has used Mimikatz to exploit a domain controller via the ZeroLogon exploit (CVE-2020-1472).[7]

G1003 Ember Bear

Ember Bear has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as MS17-010, also known as Eternal Blue, during operations.[8]

S0367 Emotet

Emotet has been seen exploiting SMB via a vulnerability exploit like EternalBlue (MS17-010) to achieve lateral movement and propagation.[9][10][11][12]

S0363 Empire

Empire has a limited number of built-in modules for exploiting remote SMB, JBoss, and Jenkins servers.[13]

G0046 FIN7

FIN7 has exploited ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) against vulnerable domain controllers.[14]

S0143 Flame

Flame can use MS10-061 to exploit a print spooler vulnerability in a remote system with a shared printer in order to move laterally.[15][16]

G0117 Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has exploited known vulnerabilities in remote services including RDP.[17][18][19]

S0260 InvisiMole

InvisiMole can spread within a network via the BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) and EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144) vulnerabilities in RDP and SMB respectively.[20]

S0532 Lucifer

Lucifer can exploit multiple vulnerabilities including EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144) and EternalRomance (CVE-2017-0144).[21]

G0045 menuPass

menuPass has used tools to exploit the ZeroLogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472).[22]

G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has exploited the Microsoft Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472).[23]

S0368 NotPetya

NotPetya can use two exploits in SMBv1, EternalBlue and EternalRomance, to spread itself to other remote systems on the network.[24][25][26]

S0378 PoshC2

PoshC2 contains a module for exploiting SMB via EternalBlue.[27]

S0650 QakBot

QakBot can move laterally using worm-like functionality through exploitation of SMB.[28]

S0603 Stuxnet

Stuxnet propagates using the MS10-061 Print Spooler and MS08-067 Windows Server Service vulnerabilities.[29]

G0027 Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has exploited MS17-010 to move laterally to other systems on the network.[30]

G0131 Tonto Team

Tonto Team has used EternalBlue exploits for lateral movement.[31]

S0266 TrickBot

TrickBot utilizes EternalBlue and EternalRomance exploits for lateral movement in the modules wormwinDll, wormDll, mwormDll, nwormDll, tabDll.[32]

S0366 WannaCry

WannaCry uses an exploit in SMBv1 to spread itself to other remote systems on a network.[33][34][35]

G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has exploited or attempted to exploit Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) and EternalBlue (MS17-010) vulnerabilities.[36][37][38]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing

Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. Risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in these systems may still exist. [39]

M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Minimize available services to only those that are necessary.

M1050 Exploit Protection

Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [40] Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. [41] Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for all software or services targeted.

M1030 Network Segmentation

Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical systems and services to controlled methods.

M1026 Privileged Account Management

Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation.

M1019 Threat Intelligence Program

Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization.

M1051 Update Software

Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers.

M1016 Vulnerability Scanning

Regularly scan the internal network for available services to identify new and potentially vulnerable services.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0015 Application Log Application Log Content

Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.

DS0029 Network Traffic Network Traffic Content

Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as known payloads.

References

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  15. Gostev, A. (2012, May 28). The Flame: Questions and Answers. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
  16. Gostev, A. (2012, May 30). Flame: Bunny, Frog, Munch and BeetleJuice…. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
  17. ClearSky. (2020, February 16). Fox Kitten – Widespread Iranian Espionage-Offensive Campaign. Retrieved December 21, 2020.
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  21. Hsu, K. et al. (2020, June 24). Lucifer: New Cryptojacking and DDoS Hybrid Malware Exploiting High and Critical Vulnerabilities to Infect Windows Devices. Retrieved November 16, 2020.
  1. Symantec. (2020, November 17). Japan-Linked Organizations Targeted in Long-Running and Sophisticated Attack Campaign. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
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  6. Nettitude. (2018, July 23). Python Server for PoshC2. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  7. CS. (2020, October 7). Duck Hunting with Falcon Complete: A Fowl Banking Trojan Evolves, Part 2. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  8. Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved. 2017/09/22
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