APT5
APT5 is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. APT5 has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Associated Group Descriptions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| Mulberry Typhoon | |
| MANGANESE | |
| BRONZE FLEETWOOD | |
| Keyhole Panda | |
| UNC2630 |
Techniques Used
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1554 | 主机软件二进制文件妥协 |
APT5 has modified legitimate binaries and scripts for Pulse Secure VPNs including the legitimate DSUpgrade.pm file to install the ATRIUM webshell for persistence.[3][4] |
|
| Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | 伪装: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
APT5 has named exfiltration archives to mimic Windows Updates at times using filenames with a |
| Enterprise | T1136 | .001 | 创建账户: Local Account |
APT5 has created Local Administrator accounts to maintain access to systems with short-cycle credential rotation.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1190 | 利用公开应用程序漏洞 |
APT5 has exploited vulnerabilities in externally facing software and devices including Pulse Secure VPNs and Citrix Application Delivery Controllers.[3][4][1] [2] |
|
| Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | 命令与脚本解释器: PowerShell |
APT5 has used PowerShell to accomplish tasks within targeted environments.[4] |
| .003 | 命令与脚本解释器: Windows Command Shell |
APT5 has used cmd.exe for execution on compromised systems.[4] |
||
| Enterprise | T1562 | .006 | 妨碍防御: Indicator Blocking |
APT5 has used the CLEANPULSE utility to insert command line strings into a targeted process to prevent certain log events from occurring.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | 归档收集数据: Archive via Utility |
APT5 has used the JAR/ZIP file format for exfiltrated files.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | 操作系统凭证转储: LSASS Memory |
APT5 has used the Task Manager process to target LSASS process memory in order to obtain NTLM password hashes. APT5 has also dumped clear text passwords and hashes from memory using Mimikatz hosted through an RDP mapped drive.[4] |
| .002 | 操作系统凭证转储: Security Account Manager |
APT5 has copied and exfiltrated the SAM Registry hive from targeted systems.[4] |
||
| Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | 数据分段: Local Data Staging |
APT5 has staged data on compromised systems prior to exfiltration often in |
| Enterprise | T1083 | 文件和目录发现 |
APT5 has used the BLOODMINE utility to discover files with .css, .jpg, .png, .gif, .ico, .js, and .jsp extensions in Pulse Secure Connect logs.[4] |
|
| Enterprise | T1654 | 日志枚举 |
APT5 has used the BLOODMINE utility to parse and extract information from Pulse Secure Connect logs.[4] |
|
| Enterprise | T1078 | .002 | 有效账户: Domain Accounts |
APT5 has used legitimate account credentials to move laterally through compromised environments.[3] |
| .004 | 有效账户: Cloud Accounts |
APT5 has accessed Microsoft M365 cloud environments using stolen credentials. [4] |
||
| Enterprise | T1505 | .003 | 服务器软件组件: Web Shell |
APT5 has installed multiple web shells on compromised servers including on Pulse Secure VPN appliances.[3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1070 | 移除指标 |
APT5 has used the THINBLOOD utility to clear SSL VPN log files located at |
|
| .003 | Clear Command History |
APT5 has cleared the command history on targeted ESXi servers.[4] |
||
| .004 | File Deletion |
APT5 has deleted scripts and web shells to evade detection.[3][4] |
||
| .006 | Timestomp | |||
| Enterprise | T1049 | 系统网络连接发现 |
APT5 has used the BLOODMINE utility to collect data on web requests from Pulse Secure Connect logs.[4] |
|
| Enterprise | T1098 | .007 | 账号操控: Additional Local or Domain Groups |
APT5 has created their own accounts with Local Administrator privileges to maintain access to systems with short-cycle credential rotation.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1056 | .001 | 输入捕获: Keylogging |
APT5 has used malware with keylogging capabilities to monitor the communications of targeted entities.[5][6] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | 进程发现 |
APT5 has used Windows-based utilities to carry out tasks including tasklist.exe. [4] |
|
| Enterprise | T1055 | 进程注入 |
APT5 has used the CLEANPULSE utility to insert command line strings into a targeted process to alter its functionality.[4] |
|
| Enterprise | T1021 | .001 | 远程服务: Remote Desktop Protocol |
APT5 has moved laterally throughout victim environments using RDP.[4] |
| .004 | 远程服务: SSH |
APT5 has used SSH for lateral movement in compromised environments including for enabling access to ESXi host servers.[4] |
||
| Enterprise | T1053 | .003 | 预定任务/作业: Cron |
APT5 has made modifications to the crontab file including in |
Software
References
- National Security Agency. (2022, December). APT5: Citrix ADC Threat Hunting Guidance. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, September). Digital threats from East Asia increase in breadth and effectiveness. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
- Perez, D. et al. (2021, April 20). Check Your Pulse: Suspected APT Actors Leverage Authentication Bypass Techniques and Pulse Secure Zero-Day. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
- Perez, D. et al. (2021, May 27). Re-Checking Your Pulse: Updates on Chinese APT Actors Compromising Pulse Secure VPN Devices. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
- FireEye. (2015, March). SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN EVOLVING CYBER THREAT LANDSCAPE. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
- Mandiant. (n.d.). Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). Retrieved February 14, 2024.
- Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.
- Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). BRONZE FLEETWOOD. Retrieved February 5, 2024.